University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1976

The investment tax credit: Time for appraisal
Barbara J. Tremper
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Tremper, Barbara J., "The investment tax credit: Time for appraisal" (1976). Graduate Student Theses,
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8480.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8480

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

THE INVESTMEHT TAX CREDIT:

TIME FOR APPRAISAL

By
Barbara J. Tremper
•:'v , Uîiivcrciby oT uoivbann-, 1930
Presented in partial luliillr.icnt of the requirements for the ucqrcc of
Masters of Business Administration
UHI'/ERSITY OF MC:TTA:TA
1976

Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Ilcaininer

Deaix^Gradua-

Date

Cchoo

UMI Number: EP39281

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
UMI EP39281
Published by ProOuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProOuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

Pro.Q^sf
ProOuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346

< n

TABLE OF CONTEtiTS
Chapter

Page

I. INTRODUCTION
II,

.............................................

HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

"

.....................................

4

President Kennedy's Revolutionary Proposal
4
The 1961 Committee Hearings ............ -................... 5
On—Again—Off—Again Career
B
III.

THE CURRE'IT INCOME TAX PROVISIONS.......................... 12
General Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
VHiich Property Qualifies and Does Not Qualify , , , , , . . 1 3
Progress Pa^-mients . . . , . . . . . . . . ,
, . . . . , . 1 6
Limitations
,l6
Carrybacks and Carryforwards . , . . , . , , . , , . , . . 1 6
Recapture Rules ....................................... , . 1 7
E50P R i d e r ........................................... ' . . 17
Public Utilities B r e a k ............................. .. . IB
The End R e s u l t ............................................ IB

IV.

ACCOUNTING PROBLIIIS.........................................19
The Dilemma of the Accounting Principles Board . . . * . . 19
Financial Statement Presentation . . . . . . . . , . , , . 2 3
Disclosure R u l e s .......................................... 32
Technical Difficulties • • • • • ........................ 34
Special Problems with Public Utility Company Regulations . 36
41
Summary .........................

r. MICROECONOMIC E F F E C T S ...................................... 42
Surveys of Individual F i r m s ......................... .. .
The Investment Tax Credit as a Factor in Financial
Decision Making .........................................
Some Important Things to Consider in Investment Ta;c
Credit D e c i s i o n s ..............
Summary of Microeconomic E f f e c t s ............
VI.

42
45
ii.B
53

MICROECONOMIC E F F E C T S ...................................... 55
The Over—All Dollar Impact . , , . . . . . . . . , . . . , 5
Economic Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Two Current Opposing Viewpoints of the Macroeconomic
Effects , , , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . , , , . . . . 6
The Current Capital Crisis .................. . . . . . .
Summary of Macroeconomic Effects . , . , . , . . . . . . , 6

IX

5
7
3
66
7

ll:.

VII.

C O N C L U S I O N ................................................. 68

VIII.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y ...............................................73
B o o k s ...................................... .............. 73
Periodicals— Signed A r t i c l e s ............................ 73
............. 75
Periodicals— Unsigned Articles . . . . . .
Govermient Publications ........ . . . . . . ............ 75

LIST OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit

Page

1. Capital Consumption Allowances of United States Versus
................... 7
Seven Foreign Countries........ .. .
2. Calculation of the Investment Tax Credit
3«

• * • • • • • * * 1 3

Section 33 Property— Lists of Qualified Property and
Property Not Qualified for Investment Credit . . . . . .

13

Illustration of "Flow Through" Versus "Deferral" Method
in Accounting for the Investment Tax Credit . . . . . . . 2 5
Survey of Practices in Accounting for the Investment Tax
Credit in 1974

26

^. An Example of Disclosure in Notes to Financial Statements
of Investment Tax Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3
An Example of Disclosure in Notes to Financial Statements
of Investment Tax Credit; Winnebago Industries, 1974 . . 2o
3. Consolidated Statements of Income, Montana Power Company,
1973 and 1974 ..........................

29

9. Consolidated Balance Sheet, Montana Power Company, 1973
and 1974

30

10.

Some Typical Balances in the Accuinulated Deferred Investment
Credit Per Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1974 . . . .

31

11.

An Example of the Calculation of the Amortization for the
Investment Tax Credit ............ . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5

12.

A Survey of Current Practices of Utility Regulatory

Commissions in the Accounting and Rato—Making Treatment
of the Tax Reduction Attributable to the Investment Tax
C r e d i t ............
.39
13.

Cost of Ser-'\n_ce for Test Year— Montana Power Company

...

40

14.

A Hypothetical itcajnple of a Net Present Value Study ShoihLng
Possible Effects of the Investment Taic Credit on the
Rate of Return . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . Z|7

15.

Net Present Value Study Comparing Rapid Amortization Versus
Tax Credit for Pollution Control Facilities ............

50

16. Kelso Financing Model for E S O P ............................ 52

17.

Estimated Decrease (increase) of Individual and Corporate
Liability Effected by Enactment (Suspension, Repeal) of
the Investment Tax Credit as Estimated by Government
Economists Through the Years . . . . . . . # . . . . . 5 6

iS,

The Effects of Various Taic Incentives 1954 to 1966

19.

Investment in Producers' Durable Equipment and Gross
National P r o d u c t ..........

»...

59
6,2

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Time for appraisal of the investment tax credit could not be more
appropriate than in 197&.

In the hollow of recession, fighting against

inflation, and facing a trillion dollar "Capital Crisis," our government
must find the best way to stimulate business investment without causing
inflation.

The Tax Reduction Act of 1975» enacted by Congress, extended

the investment tax credit for two more years and boosted the rate to 10
percent.

Now before Congress is the Tax Reform Act of 1975 providing an

additional four years' extension through 19Ô0,

President Ford recently

proposed a permanent 10 percent investment tax credit which, if approved,
will give this investment incentive an established place in our tax
structure.
In addition, conflicts are astirring among those institutions con
cerned with accounting practices:

the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),

the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the Congress as to who
should prescribe accounting procedures.

Economists are questioning the

basic purpose of accounting which has traditionally been the conservative
and factual reporting on a microeconomic level, asserting that the ac
counting profession should be charged with the responsibility for macroeconomic effects of their accounting pronouncements.

Accountants are

disturbed with the SEC in some of its recent decisions regarding the
financial reporting of banlts.

In such a controversial climate, congressional

intervention into accounting matters is a constant threat:

"Congress,

which operates primarily on political considerations, could take a direct
hand in accounting matters— as it did with the investment tax credit
several years ago and tried to do recently with the oil and gas industry.
Should that occur, the consequences could be disastrous."^
The background of the investment tax credit is disconcertingly
controversial.

Beginning as a macroeconomic dream of John F. Kennedy for

industrial growth, it was shackled in congressional regulation, turned on
and off through the years according to economic climate and political
w h i m s , while details of its microeconomic application formed a battle
ground for accountants, the SEC, the Internal Revenue Service (iRS), and
the Congress.
Public utilities present a unique problem in accounting for the
investment tax credit which becomes an important concern for ratepayers
and regulatory commissions, particularly in light of the recent increase
from U percent to 10 percent as applied to rapidly escalating costs of
producing energy.
But more importantly, has the investment tax credit been effec
tive?

On a microeconomic level, what effects has it had on the individual

firm's investment decisions, and how can firms better plan and utilize
this tax incentive to their advantage?

On a macroeconomic level, how

does the investment tax credit stack up as a fiscal tool for the stimula
tion of investment?

Is it, like the oil depletion allowance,

just another

^Robert Mims, "Commentary," Business Week, January 19, 197&, p. 26,

tax "gimmick" for corporations?

Can it be an effective mechanism for

p

helping to raise "The $4#5—Trillion America Needs to Grow?"''

Has it,

during those years it has been in effect, really accomplished its avowed
purpose of stimulating American firms to modernize and revitalize their
productive processes to compete better in today's world market?
In exploring t h e s e .questions and concerns, this paper will:
(l) present a historic background for perspective,

(2) define the invest

ment tax credit in terms of the current tax provisions,

(3) examine the

accounting problems which the tax law creates, and (4) appraise the ef
fectiveness of the investment tax credit on a microeconomic level, then
on a macroeconomic level.

^Business W e e k , Special Issue, September 22, 1975, cover.

CHAPTER II
HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
The investment tape credit was first conceived as part of the in
novative and liberal economic policies of the Kennedy Administration.
This investment incentive can best be described by tracing its history
from that early economic ideal through congressional mutations to the
current income tax regulations as administered by the Internal Revenue
Service.

Few tax laws have undergone more revision, suspension and con

troversy than the investment tax credit.

Its history presents a sharp

contrast between what it was meant to be and what it has now become.
President Kennedy's Revolutionary Proposal
In his message to the House of Representatives on April 20, 1961,
President Kennedy made it clear that he would utilize strong fiscal
policy "to promote economic stability and stimulate economic growth."
In his speech, he said;
A strong and sound Federal tax system is essential to America's
future. Without such a system, we cannot maintain our defenses
and give leadership to the free world. Without such a system,,
we cannot render the public services necessary for enriching the
lives of our people and furthering the growth of our economy . . .
Forced to reconstruct after wartime devastation, our friends
abroad now possess a modern industrial system helping to make
them formidable competitors in world markets. If our own goods
are to compete with foreign goods in price and quality, both at
home and abroad, we shall need the most efficient plant and
equipment . . . Specifically, therefore, I recommend enactment
of an investment tax credit . . . I believe this investment tax

credit will become a useful and continuous part of our tax.
structure. But it will be a new venture and remain in need
of review. Moreover, it may prove desirable for the Congress
to modify the credit from time to time and to adapt it to the
needs of a changing economy.
The 1961 Committee Hearings
The Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
heard in great detail from many diverse people all the arguments for and
against the investment tax credit in the May of 19^1*

Those arguments

still rage today.
To set the stage, there was great concern at that time about
America's stance in world trade.

After World War II, the United States

had helped foreign competitors reconstruct their economies with new and
more efficient plants— plants which were manufacturing goods in competi
tion with American products.

Economists were alarmed at the deficit in

the balance of payments, and businessmen were complaining about their
inability to meet foreign competition and the great influx of foreign
products on the American market.

The cry of business was for tax relief

to provide more cash flow to modernize their plants and equipment to meet
this competition.

Specifically, business was pushing hard for more rapid

depreciation allowances.
Most of the early debate took the form of alignment between the
two main alternatives of investment incentives; i:iorc rapid depreciation
U.S., President, "Message from the President oT the United States,
Relative to our Federal Tax System," Syth Cong., 1st Sess. , House Poc. :Io.
IÜ4O, John P. Kennedy, April 2W, 19^1*

allowances or the investment credit.

Kennedy favored the credit, ar.ruin^;

that a tax credit does not increase costs, whereas depreciation charges
show up on corporate records as higher costs and thus provide an incentive
for raising prices.

Proponents for rapid depreciation entered Td:hibit 1,

page 7 » showing our standing as to depreciation practices relative to our
foreign competitors.
Kennedy’s original proposal was a 15 percent credit of all new
plant and equipment investment in excess of current depreciation allow
ances, with a 10 percent on the first $5,0^^ of new investment as a mininnm,
plus other percentage limitations.

During the hearings, accountants

pointed out the difficulty of calculating such a credit which entailed
two CO,.]pie te depreciation schedules, one for qualified investment tax
credit properly .and another for other depreciable property.

Rather, they

favored a flat 7 percent rate*
The investment tax credit was a direct reduction of the income
tax payable equal to a specified percentage of qualified investment prop
erty purchased in that year.
In brief, arguments against the investment tax credit during that
l]-»itial debate were :
",

Discrimination
Rig companies would be favored because they had more dollars
to invest.
Complexity
It was too difficult to fi,gu.ro.

.

Sub sidy
This was, in nature, a subsidy for business and if one group
is given a subsidy, others would demand similar treatment.

EXHIBIT 1
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* A mimeographed description of the data is available on request.

1961

Source :

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Hays and 'leans, Hearings,
on the Tscc Recommendations of the President, before the Committee
on Hays and Means, House of Representatives,• Cyth Cong., 1st
sess., Hoc. No. 140, Vol. 2, p. 971.

k.

Une er ta in by
A business could not rely on the auaounb of the credit, the
rate, or whether it would be available from time bo time,
making planning impossible. Carryforwards were uncertain as
to amount until the amount of the ta>c liability for each
future period was determined.

.

Depreciation Reform
Enactment of the investment tax credit wifi only delay needed
depreciation reform. More rapid depreciation is preferred
because it creates cash flow before tax rates are applied.

The main argujnents in favor of the investnionb tax credit were:
1.

.

Imm ediabe Ilffeet
The effect of the investment tax credit is felt in the first
year of the asset's life providing almost immediate cash
flow to help defray the asset's cost. Depreciation, on the
other hand, spreads that tax benefit over the life of the
asset resulting in delayed cash flows.
The investment tax credit does not show up as additional costs
on the income statement; rather it is a reduced cost of in
come tax. Thus the investment tax credit would be less in
flationary .

Congressional revisions of the investment tax credit proposal
included the adoption of the 7 percent flat rate rather than tying the
credit to the depreciation schedule, omission of plant as qualified prop
erty and allowing only machinery and equipment, and the Long Amendment
requiring that the depreciable basis of the investment tæc credit property
be reduced by the amount of the allowed credit.

In this form, then, the

investment tax credit was passed in 1962.
On-Again—Off-Again Career
But from its original passage in 1962, the investment tax credit
was destined for a sporadic career.

The Long Amendment was repealed in

196/4. after much complaint from businessmen that the benefits of the in
vestment tax credit were eroded by the lower depreciation basis which
resulted in lessened depreciation allowances on investment tax credit
property.

In 1966 , President Johnson pressed for a suspension of the invest
ment tax credit in order to dampen an inflationary economy, but this sus
pension was repealed after only five months when the economy slowed dovm.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 eliminated the investment tax credit
in what Congress called a "complete and final termination."

In 1969 the

cry was for tax reform because too many rich people were not paying their
fair share.

It was felt, too, that those tax laws which were enacted for

economic reasons may have been desirable
needed

at one time but were no longer

as "in the case of the investment tax credit which was adopted in

1962 as a method of attracting investment in plant and eouipment but which
in the last two years appears to have been an important factor in over—

p

heating the investment goods industry.""

After a number of years' ex

perience with the investment tax credit,

some new arguments against it

arose:
•

Î.
1.

The investment tax credit fails to distinguish between those
investments which would have been made in the absence of a
bonanza and those which were made because of the added in
centive.
Priorities are distorted in that federal dollars are being
spent to help big business while social programs suffer.
The investment tax credit benefits do not go to that segment
of business which engages in foreign competition.

Dut most important in 1969 was a political push to repeal the very unpopular
income tax surcharge, and a repeal of the investment tax credit would com
pensate the treasury coffers for funds lost in the surcharge repeal.

2

Thus,

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Tæ-c Reform Act
of 1969 , Report, on H.R. 13270, 91st C o n g . , 1st sess., 1969, p. 9#

to "balance the budget" and dampen inflation, the investment tax credit
was terminated.
But the winds of politics and economic trends shifted again in
1971 when President Nixon, called for a reinstatement of the credit which
he renamed the "Job Development Credit,"— a more appealing nomenclature
for a congress growing more alarmed at rising unemplo^mient.

President

Nixon's argujnents in his tax message were aimed at the well-being of
American life, the need to expand real GNP, increase the rate of return
on investments, pro^rlde an incentive in productive facilities, and increase
employment.

The investment tax credit was reinstated in the 1971 Revenue

Act, and it has continued to be in effect for the past four years.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 gave it a two-year extension and
boosted the rate from 7 percent to 10 percent (from A percent to 10 per
cent for public utilities) along with other changes.
Before Congress now is the Tax

Reform Act of 1975

an extension of the investment tax credit through

which callsfor

1930, and President Ford

recently called for a permanent 10 percent investment tax credit.
The reason for its sporadic history is that Congress and economic
advisors view the investment tao; credit as a fiscal spigot that can be
turned on and off to smooth out the cyclical gyrations of the economy.
But such macroeconomic mechanisms often do not produce the desired micro
economic effect.

Because of the frequent tampering by Congress, the

credit lost much of its incentive to business investment since most in
vestment decisions require planning years in advance and financial managers
cannot really depend on whether or not
time to time, nor at what rate.

the credit will be available from

Moreover, with so much legislation, the income tax regulations in
volving the investment tax credit have become hopelessly bogged dovm.
Congress has a way of making even the simplest of economic theory into
inconceivably complex law.

CHAPTER III
THE CURREInTT INCOME TAX PROVISIONS
'.Tnen economists talk indiscriminately about a 10 percent tax in
centive, it is important to realize the stringent rules regarding the
limitations both as to amounts allowed and to the kind of property which
qualifies.

Unless the precise regulations arc knoi-ai, a person could be

very misled as to the real effect and meaning of the investment tax credit
on business invest,vient.

Presented here, then, in brief form, is an ex

planation of the current tax law (as enacted by the Tax Reduction Act of
1975).

There is much danger in attempting to reduce complicated tax codes

to simjjle lan.guage; for every code section there arc many exceptions,
qualifications and elaborations of the regulations.

The reader who wishes

more exacting detail is advised to refer to the income tax re gelations.
General Provisions
In general, the investment tao: credit is a direct reduction of the
income tæ: payable; that is, it is subtracted fro:ii the calculated ta:: due.
Thus, it is not a deduction, but a direct reduction of income tax.

The

amount of the credit is equal to a specified percentage of certain ’’qualified"
depreciable assets, called Section 38 assets, as defined by the code.
The credit is subject to limitations and the amount available in any one
year is used first to reduce the amount of the income ta::, payable for that
year.

Unused credits can ne:<.t be carried back three years, generating ta:-:

refunds, then forward for seven years in a certain prescribed order.

EXHIBIT 2
Calculation of Investment Tax Credit
(an example)
Estimated
Life

Asset
Truck

h

012,000

Office Machine

6

13,000

10

20,000

Piant Equipm ont

Qualified
Investment

Cost
33 1/3
66 2/3

12,000
20,000

lOO

Total Qualified Investment
Tax Credit Percentage

0 4,000

36,000
la/

X .10

Investment Ta>: Credit

$ 3,600

E::hibit 2, above, shows hov; the investment credit is calculated
using the current rate of 10 percent.

The percentage of the asset's cost

which qualifies for the credit is determined by its estimated life.

The

rule is:
Estimated Life of Asset
7 years or more
5 or 6 years
3 or A years
less than 3 years

Percentage of Cost
■ruich fualifies
66 2/3
33 1/3
o

Which Property Qualifies and Does Not Qualify
Lost ta>; court cases concerning investment tax .credit center
around the interpretation of "Code Section 33," that code section of the
Income T&ix Regulations which describes property qualifying for the invest
ment tax credit.

Briefly, Section 33 Property is of two general types:

(l) depreciable tangible personal property, and (2) depreciable real
property (except buildings and their structural components) which isused in manufacturing, production, extraction or the use of utility-like

services, or a research facility or bulk storage facility for fur,foible
commodities used to produce a product or a service.

Examples of the

first type include depreciable livestock (but not horses), counters in
stores, office equipment, motor vehicles, etc.
type are:

I>:a;nples of the second

oil derricks, oil and gas pipelines, broadcast towers and even

citrus trees.
Most buildings and their structural components such as wiring,
plumbing, central air conditioning and furnaces do not qualify for the
credit.

One of the determinants of what is a structural comnonent is its

movability; thus movable partitions in banks were considered eligible for
the investment credit.
credit is property:

Other property which does not qualify for the

(l) with estimated life under three years, (2) used

by a government or exempt organization, (3) amortized under special law
such as pollution control facilities, (Z|.) under sale or leaseback arrange
ment, (5) acquired from a related person, (6) used previously by the
taxpayer, (7) converted from personal use, (0) disposed of in the year
acquired, (9) used to furnish lodging (except for transients), (]0) used
outside the U.d. (except for certain transportation property), or (ll)
inherited or received as a gift.
Exhibit 3 is a list of examples of qualified and unqualified
property.

The lists often do not make sense when viewed in tlie context

of the original purpose of the investment tax credit— to stimulate in
vestment in productive facilities.

A Lear ,jeb airplane to fly corporate

executives around and plush office furnishings for managers will qualify
for the credit while a factory building does not qualify.

Section 33 Property— Lists of Qualified Property
and Property Not Qualified for Investment Credit
P ro pe rty jU a lific J fo r Investment Ta;: C re d it

Pro'oert;/ Pot p u a lific d f o r Investment Tax C re d it

L le va to rs
E scalators
Leased Equipment
L ive sto ck; C a ttle , ? u r-P c a rir." /tr.imals, lo a ts , U030 ,
M inks, 3'nec''
O ffshore D r i l l in g Eoui;nnent
Submarine Telephone Cables
Steam-Ceneratir." Cables
jU r-C o n d itio r.iiip anJ H u ii. lit y C ontrol 3yste::is Required
fo r Proper C '^croti or. o f Ct'ner Machiner '
Com C ribs
Gas Storage Tanks
Grain Stora^^e Mins
O il .Gtora^e Tanks
S ilo s
Test Stands
Mind Tunnels
A ir p o rt Pavir."
Sank 'fa u lt Moors
Mrive-'Jp T e lle r s ' ..'in .ov.‘s in Manks
F ire E xtin vu isn crs
G olf Course '.ia te rin ' Gystem
Grocery Counters
H ydrau lic Car L if t s
Peon and Other Gl 'no
O ffic e dquipr.icnt
R e fri[o ra tio n GnuipicnL
R e fri;[e ra to rs
Voice Co.'.imunication Gystons
■; a l l- t o - . ; a l l C a r 'c tin Broadcastin.p Towers
C itru s Trees
Fences Used to Confine LivestockPaved la m y a rd s
S o ft F rin k Vendin- "aci'.incs
Henhouses
Orchards and Groves
Uater P e lls
I o [ p in [ Truck IjDads
■das P ir c lin e s
■Gasoline Pumps
Gusiness Autom obiles, Trucks
Telcohotie Poles

nascb all P la y e rs ' C ontracts
Reusable M o ttle s
P u ild in ’ s
M illb o a rd s
Giant Amusement Glides
Outdoor L iq b tin p F a c ilit y
In ta n g ib le P ro p e rty: C op yriyh ts, P atents, Subs c r io tio n L is t s , R iver
Motton M recirin"
L iv e s to c k : Morses
Paved Parkin-' Areas
A ir - C o n f.itio r in r Gystc.m
C e ilin -’ s
Chimneys
Doors
F ire Pscancs
Gas-Fire 1 Heaters
Gl'i T i f t 'Equipment; Cable Suoport Towers,
Passen-'^er Ranrc
S;.'rir_kler Cyst cms
T r a ile r Park Laundere t be
Mare’.iouscs
d'atcr Coolers
■Jin-.lo’.'s
Gp o rts MtaJiun?
Railway S tatio ns
■Stables
Greenhouses
Bus G tations
la rn s
f i r p o rt Mar.'Vcrs
Polyst;,Ter.c In s u la tio n

Source:

Co.mmercc C le a rin ' House, 1 '7 ‘3 U.G. Master Tax ''jui.-lc (re v , e d ,; C hicaro:

Commerce C le a rin f House, I n c . ,

197/1.
vn

Progress Payments

A new provision in the 1975 law allows a taxpayer to elect to treat
progress payments on property under construction as investment in the year
paid.

Previously, the property had to be completed before the credit

could be taken.

To qualify, the property must have a life of seven years

or more and a normal construction period of two years or less.

Limitations
The limitations on the amount of credit that can be applied, in
general are:
• The credit cannot exceed tax liability (for
reduced by certain other credits.

1,

that year) as

If the tax liability is greater than 52$,003, the credit
allowed is $2$,000 plus only $0 percent of the amount by
which the liability exceeds $25,000.
Example:
A taypayer's tax liability is $10,000.
His qualified
investment is $350,000 x 10% or an investment credit of
$ 3 5 f000.
The credit allowed is limited to $32,$00 ($2$,000
plus $0,0 of $15,000, the tax liability over $25,000.)
The cost of used property is limited to $100,000,

Carrybacks and Carryforwards
Unused investment credit, in the amount it exceeds the limits
above, can be carried back three years, then forward seven years.

It

must first be applied to the earliest year, then to consecutively following
years.

The computation for these -carrybacks and carryforwards are complex,

especially when combined with years when the credit was

suspended, the

rate changed, or the number of allowable carryforward years differed.

The

^Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1975 U.S. Master Tax Guide (rev. e d . ;
Chicago, 111.:
Commerce Clearing House, I n c . , 1974) » paragraph 1179.

carrybacks generate income tax refunds and the carryforwards can be used
to reduce income tax payable in future periods.

Recapture Rules
If the property is sold before the expiration of its estimated
life as claimed for investment tax credit purposes, the credit must be
recomputed and additional income tax paid in the year the property is sold,
The amount of the additional tax due is the difference between the credit
which was actually taken on that asset in the year it was purchased and
the credit which would have been allowed on the actual years the asset
was kept.

ESOP Rider
Under the T;ix Reduction Act oC 1975» an 11 percent investment tax
credit is allowed for firms contributing 1 percent of the investment tax
credit to a qualified Employee Stock Option Plan (PSOP).

Tying the ESO^

concept to the investment tax credit is a new innovation sponsored by
Senator Russell Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee to "provide
a means through which the equity of companies can be distributed among
their employees, thus resulting in a broader base of capital ov/nership
and wealth, which could benefit society as a whole."'"
The ESOP rider has little relationship to investment incentives,
but its inclusion will stimulate financial managers to look more closely
at this little—used type of stock plan in making financial decisions.

Gordon Binns, J r . , "ESOPs;
A Joint Piece of the Action,"
Financial Etacutive, September, 1975» p. A9.

In

effect I the goveriunent is financing the purchase of a company's stock by
that company's employees.

Public Utilities Break
The Tæc Reduction Act of 1975 gave enormous "te^ breaks" to public
utility companies.

For the years 1975 through 197(5, utility companies

can offset 100 percent (no upper limits) of allowable credit against in
come ta:': due.

In many cases, tliis will generate huge ta;: refunds under

the carryback provisions.
This 100 percent limit is to be whittled dovai 10 percent a year
until 19II when it levels out at 50 percent.

In addition, utility com

panies were increased from A percent under the old law to 10 percent (ll
percent with

under the now law.

Congress decided that the utility companies needed help in buildinr
much-needed ener/gy facilities (or, one w o nders, succumbed to some strong
lobbying efforts on the part of the utility companies).

The End Result
This, then, is the law as it now exists with all its complexities
and restrictions.

Congress, in its frantic effort to "close loopholes,"

has shackled the investment ta:': credit with sucli stringent and complicated
regulations that Lhe end product seems antipodal to the c n v L s i o n e d economic
stimulus toward i.iore modern and efficient productive facilities.

CHAPTER IV
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS
The effect of any law is dependent upon its application.

With tax

laws, the accountants who file tax returns and prepare financial state
ments are the ones who must ultimately wrestle with the principles and
technicalities surrounding the regulations.
The Dilemma of the Accounting Principles Board
In 1962, one of the first tasks of the then newly formed Accounting
Principles Board (APB)., the chief policy making board of the American
Institute of Certified. Public Accountants, was how to account for the in
vestment tax credit.

The APB issued its official pronouncement in December,

1962, in Opinion Po. 2:

"Accounting for the *Investment Credit.'"

In

this Opinion, three concepts were considered as to the nature of the tax
credit:

(l) subsidy by way of contribution to capital, (2) reduction in

taxes for that year in which the credit arises, or (3 ) reduction in a
cost otherwise chargeable to future accounting periods.

"The basic ac

counting issue was not whether the investment tax credit increased net
income, but rather, the accounting period(s) during which it should be re
flected in the operating statements."^
and considered only the last two.

The Board discarded the first option

These have come to be known as the

2
American Institute of Public Accountants, Accounting Principles
Board, Opinion !Io. 2: "Accounting for the 'InvesLmcnt Credit*" (New York:
AI CPA, 666 Fifth Avenue, Dece:nber,. 1962) , paragraph A.

"flow through" method and the "deferral" method.

Under the "flow through,"

the entire credit flows through to income in the year that it arises as a
direct offset against income tax expense.

The "deferral" metliod takes the

amount of the credit into income over the useful life of the asset which
gave rise to the credit.

The Board's conclusion was that the "investment

credit should be reflected in net income over the productive life of the
acquired property and not in the year in which it is placed into service.
In other w o r d s , APB prescribed the "deferral" method.
Soon afterward, the Security iP-:change Commission (SPC) in its
publication. Accounting Series Release I'Jo. 96, announced that it would
accept either the "deferral" method or the "flow through" method.

The

SRC cited as a reason for allowing both methods that there was substantial
diversity of opinion among responsible persons as to tlic proper methiod of
accounting.
Since many firms were using the direct "flow through" method in
accounting for the investment tax credit as allowed under SRC, the A^B
felt compelled to consider the question again.
Opinion i'To. A:

In l9oAj the APB issued

(Amending TIo. 2) "Accounting for the. 'Investment Credit. '"

In this Opinion, the iloard noted the January 1973 BBC Accounting Series
Release ÎIo. 96 wliich allowed a flow through to income in the year the
credit arises, and that the Revenue Ae'o of 196/1 eliminated the reouirement
that for inco nc taa %ur;:'OScs the basis of the property must be reduced
(the Long Amendment) , and that a nunber o t compianies in actual practice
" Ibid. , j.-ai’agraph 13

were treating the investment credit as a flow through to income
in the year the credit arose.
Opinion No.

Thus, the ^oari stated, it was revising its

2 which had not received general acceptability.

Opinion No.

k stated that Lhc Poard still favored the "deferral**

method, but that it would also approve the alternative !?iethod of "flow
through."

Thus, both methods were appro’'ed.

sign of weakness on the part of the
away from sound accounting theory.

uany feel that it was a

to accomodate the STCC an'l back
dr. 3 vacek, a incmt^cr of the

famous

for his outspokenness, proclaimed in his dissen/tirg orlnion that the newrevised On ini on ho. l\i
. . . illustrates the accounting profession's complete failure
in its responsibility to establish accounting principles that
will pro\CLdc reliable financial statements that arc comparable
ajnong com panics and industries, for use of tho public in making
personal investment decisions. [Ttierc is] . . . no justifica
tion for sanctioning two contradictory practices to accomodate
33C and other regulatory bodies an .1 some C'^As v.k;o have a p p roved
reporting the investment credit from acquisition rather than
from use of property.^
Dr. hauricc îloonitz also voiced a strong objection to the approval
of the tvjo methods of accounting:
. . . while it is conceivable that the tao: reduction method may
be right, or that cost reduction may be right, or that both are
wrong and so no other unspecified possibility right, the invest
ment credit cannot be two different tliin.gs at one an:.l the same
time . . . .
The method preferred by the majority of the ^oard
permits identical items bought from the same supplier at identical
prices to be recorded at different "costs" depending upon the
tsu: status of the purchaser and. not upon the conditions prevailing
in the transaction between buyer and seller.^'
'^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting
Principles Board, Opinion rJo. A.: (Amending ho. P) **A c c o u n t i n
for the
'Investment Credit'" (Hew York: AICPA, 66b fifth Avenue”, Îlarch,
,
paragraph 11.
^Tbid.

In 1967 In issuing Opinion TIo 11;

^'Accounting for Incoinc Taupes,**

the APB postponed the investment credit question:

"The Board is continuing

its study on accounting for *Investment Credits' and intends to issue a
new Opinion on the subject as soon as possible*
No* 2 and l\. remain in effect."^

In the meantime, Opinions

The suspension of the investment tax

credit and its repeal in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 halted any forthcoming
opinion.
The 1971 Revenue Act made the whole question "moot" when it re
instated the investment tax credit and allowed a "free choice" of either
the "flow through" or the "deferral" method to all companies subject to
the jurisdiction of, or making reports to, federal agencies (SBC, ICC, 3BA,
FPC, FCC • • * ad infinitum)*

For all practical purposes, few business

firms would be excluded*
In a Treasury Department Release dated January 10, 1972, the IRB
re-emphasized its position by ruling:

" 'Flow through' and 'deferral' arc

the only permissible accounting methods for investment credit under the
1972 Revenue Act."

Under the Act, a taxpayer has a one-time "free choice"

(not to be dictated by any regulatory body) to select the method used,
which can differ from the previous method used but once chosen, must be
continued.

(Unless consent to change is granted by the Secretary of the

Treasury or his delegate.)

In addition, the Treasury Release required a

taxpayer to disclose in financial reports the method of accounting used.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting
Principles Board, Opinion IJo* 11; "Accounting for Income Taxes" ('Tevj York:
AICPA, 666 Fifth Avenue, Dec^ëïïibcrl, 1967) , paragraph A.

With Congress legislating on accounting principles and procedures,
there was little left for APB to do except to issue interpretations of
the Code which it did in April, 1972, in APB Accounting Principles:
ing for the Investment Credit:
4094»"

Account

Accounting Interpretations of Section U,

This section deals mostly with the requirements for disclosure and

presentation on the financial statements.
The old APB has now been replaced by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) which v/ill probably do little in regard to the in
vestment tax credit, although there are still many inconsistencies in
financial statement presentation which- could be resolved. Thus, the two
methods of accounting for the investment tax credit stillabound

today

causing many problems in the comparability, financial presentation and
disclosure of financial statements, plus invoking considerable consterna
tion among utility regulatory bodies.
Financial Statement Presentation
The comparability of financial statements is a major concern for
investors, financial analysts, and others relying on financial data.

TTot

only is there concern for the comparability of the same firm from yearto-year, but the comparability of different firms to each other.

The al

lowance of a "free choice" of "flow through" or "deferral" makes compari
son very difficult.
A firm’s choice of whether to adopt the "flow through" or the
"deferral" method may greatly influence vital financial data such as net
income (after tax) and earnings per share.

Under "flow through" the credit

is reflected as a reduction of tax expense in the year it is recognized in

the financial statements.

Under "deferral" the credit is reflected as a

reduction of tax expense ratably (evenly over the years) over the period
during which the asset is depreciated.
As a very simplistic example, Exhibit A, page ^5» illustrates the
effect on net incouie of both methods.

In this example (ceteris paribus),

this hypothetical company's net income before tax remains constant at $50
million a year.

The company's investment tax credit allowable is $14

million for each year from 1972 through 1970 (after all limitations have
been taken into account) with a tsuc rate of 50 percent, life of assets
seven years, and at the beginning of 1972 there were no unamortized bal
ances or tax carryforwards.

The company has no investment credit in years

1979 through 190/1.
The total net income for the thirteen—year period is the same for
both methods at $/|23 million.

However, the net income in the first six

years under "flow through" is shovm to be much higher than for "deferral."
For the last six years, this situation is reversed.

In reality, of course,

a company continues to purchase new property (at ever higher costs) and
to accumulate investment credits under the "deferral" metho^l, and under
the "flow through" method to offset those credits currently against in
come during those last si>: years.

The "flow through," then, will project

the best earnings per share and net income for financial statements.
(Keep in mind that this is for financial statements only.

The net income

for income tax purposes remains unaffected by the method of accounting
for the credit.

On the income tax return the entire investment credit will

be applied to the current year's ta>c liability regardless of how it is
accounted for in the financial statements.)

ECHIDIT 4
Illustration of "Flow Through" Versus "Deferral" Method
In Accounting for the Investment Tax Credit
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It is not surprising that in the 1974 Current Accounting Trends
and Techniques the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants re
ports that the vest majority of Cd'j companies surveyed use
(3ee H-:hibit 5» below. )

riou through."

It is possible that a firn may still be amortising

"old" investment credits under the "deferral" and raay have chosen "flow
through" under the "free choice" orhion of the 1971 Pcvcnue Act, or vice
versa.

Phdiibit 5 classifies the :iietiioi used currently with subcategories

for prior "olu'" investment credits.
EXHIBIT 5
Survey of Practices in Accounting for the
Investment Tax Credit in 1974

Flow-through method:
Ho nrior years' deferral
Prior years' deferral being amortized
Subtotal

1973

1972

1971

1972

A 53
43
496

445
24
489

327
22
329

234
11
245

65
5

47
5
5
77

62
82

34
600

189
600

35
6
13
54
301

Deferral method:
Amortized over productive life
Amortized over shorter period
Anortization policy not indicatccj
Subtotal

78

Po reference to investment credit

26

Total Companies
Source:

600

12

600

American Institute of Certified. Ihiblic Accoun tant s , 197/t Accoun
Trends and Tcchnieucs in Publishcd Cory^orate Annual Reports (Pei
Y or]: : AI CPA, 666 Pi ft 11 A venu,c , 197/:.) , Table 3-Id , 1 ..

All even vjiuer disparity exists in the way various firms present
investment credit information on the income statement, balance sheet, and
the statement of chanr-cs in financial jiosition.

On the income statement, the credit is usually presented as part of
a composite figure in the "Provision for Income Tajces," t}ie particulars
of which are revealed in the "Notes to Financial Otatements," preferably
with an analysis of the income tajc account,

A good example of presenta

tion in the "Notes to Financial Statements" is ACN'h Narkcts Incorporated's
1974 jlnnual Rcporb (Pxiiibit u, page 20),

Anotlior good presentation re

vealing the effect on income and earnings per share is the 1974 Annual
Report of Ninncbago Industries, Inc. (H-diibit 7, page 2S).

Montana Power

Company's 1974 ilnnual Report shows the net fi,gure for investment ta?c
credit (fbchibit 0 , page 29).

This net fi.gure, unTortunately, is not

further analyzed in the "Notes."
Sometimes the amortization is s’
novna in the depreciation and amor
tization account as in The Southern Company's 1973 .Annual Report:

Investment tax credits are deferred and are amortized over the
average life of the property which gave rise to the credits.
Such amortization is applied as a credit to reduce "Pepreciation
and iVnortization" in the statements of income and amounted to
$2,453,000 in 1973 and $1,075,000 in 1972.'^
On the balance sheet, the investment tax credit under the deferral
method is listed under deferred credits, usually somewhere between the
Liabilities and the Capital sections, sometimes set out alone as in Jl:—
hibit 9, pare 30, in the 1974 Annual Report of the Montana Power Company.
^Hasl-cins and Sells, Accounting Practices 197A , Vol. 2 (New York:
Haskins and Sells, 1974), p. 041.
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EXHIBIT 6
An Example of Disclosure in Notes to Financial
Statements of Investment Tax Credit
(Flow-Through Method)
A C M E M A R K E T S . INC. (M AR)

Notes to Financial Statements
Note 1 (in part): Income Taxes—

The com pany pro
vides d eferred in c o m e taxes or credits w h e re there are
tim ing differences in recording in co m e and exp en ses
for financial repo rtin g and tax purposes. These tim ing
differences relate primarily to a c cele rated d ep re c ia tio n
and reserves not currently tax d edu ctib le.
Th e c o m p a n y reduces its c u rren t in co m e tax provi
sion for in vestm en t tax credits in the year in w hich th e
credits arise. Credits for 1964 and prior w h ich w ere d e 
ferred are being am o rtized over the estim ated lives of
the related assets.

Note 3: Income Taxes— Federal and state in c o m e
taxes c h a rg e d to e arn in g s are s u m m a riz e d below :
Current:
Federal (before investm ent credits)
Investment credits re a liz e d
S ta te ..........................................
D e fe rre d
A m ortization of investment credits deferred
In 1964 and prio r y e a rs .............................

Source:

1973

1972

$1,271,000
(1,500,000)
414,000
617,000

8,500,000
(1,530,000)
939,000
1,023,000

(102,000)

(132,000)

S 700,000

8,800,000

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 197A Accounting
Trends and Techniques in Published Corporate Annual Reports (Pcvj
York: AICPA, 666 Fifth Avenue, 1974) p. 2oO.

e >:h i b i t

7

An Example of Disclosure in Notes to Financial
Statements of Investment Tax Credit:
Winnebago Industries, Inc., 1974
W IN N E B A G O IN D U S T R IE S . INC . (FEB)

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements
Note D.’ T he C o m p a n y follow s the policy of recordin g
fhe investm ent credit in the year it arises as a reduction
of current tax expense. This p o licy has not had a m a te ri
al effect on net in c o m e or e a rn in g s per share for the
'Our fiscal years en d e d F ebruary 26. 1972. F o r the fiscal
year ended F eb ruary 24, 1973 this policy in creased net
'ocome $ 8 3 5 ,0 0 0 and e arn in g s p er c o m m o n share $.03.*

Source;

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974 Accounting
Trends and Techniques in j^jblishcd Corporate Annnal Rerorts (Pew "
Yorlc; ' AICPA, 666 Fifth Avenue, l97/r) , p* PSTI
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EXHIBIT 8

C O N S O L ID A T E D STATEMENT OF IN C O M E
THE M O N T A N A P O W E R C O M P A N Y A N D SU»SM>t \ R l t S

( B a s e d o n a c c o u n t s p r e s i r i l n 't l
t h e I’ u h l u S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n
o f M o n t a n a a n d t h e K e d e r a l PovM*r ( o r n r n t s s io n — N o t e 1)

Year e n d e d D e c e m b e r 31
1974
O P E R A T IN G R EVENUES:
E lectric
N a t u r a l gas ( N o t e b)
W a te r. .

O P E R A T IN G EXPENSES A N D TAXES:
O p e ra tio n
M a i n t e n a n c e ( N o t e 1) . . . . .
D e p r e c i a t i o n a n d d e p l e t i o n ( N o t e 1)
U .S . a n d C a n a d i a n i n c o m e t a x e s ( N o t e 1)
P r o v is i o n s f o r d e f e r r e d t a x e s o n i n c o m e ( N o t e 1):
A c c e le ra te d d e p re c ia tio n and a m o rtiz a tio n ,
K err P ro je c t charges
In v e s tm e n t tax cre d it — net
O t h e r taxes

7 1 .2 7 4 .4 4 4
4 (.7 4 1 .1 7 b
7 IS ,922
11 7 .7 b 1 .S 4 2

% 6 9 ,0 8 7 ,0 5 8

5 0 ..5 8 7 . 8 1 0
5 ,0 8 5 .2 5 7
8. 1 6 5 . 2 1 4
7 .6 94,1 05

3 9 ,3 1 9 ,4 0 0
4 ,7 9 6 ,3 4 8
7 ,6 1 1 ,8 9 9
1 2 ,1 5 2 ,0 0 9

1. 1 2 5 , 2 1 1
( 5 1 b . 16 1)
60 8.41 5
1 2 , 8 0 7 . 7 12
8 5 ,8 4 7 ,4 0 5

1 ,2 4 5 ,5 7 5
(5 1 6 ,3 6 1 )
6 0 0 ,0 5 7
1 2 .6 9 4 .7 6 0
7 7 .9 0 3 .6 8 7
3 0 ,1 4 4 .6 9 9

O P E R A T IN G IN C O M E

O T H E R IN C O M E A N D D E D U C T IO N S
N o n o p e ra tin g in c o m e — net
A l l o w a n c e f o r f u n d s u s e d d u r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n ( N o t e 1)

2 ,4 1 7 .0 6 9

1«29^)5
6 ,2 4 6 .9 7 4

IN C O M E B EFO RE IN T E R E S T C H A R G E S

1 8 ,1 6 1 .1 1 1

IN TE R E ST C H A R G E S .
In te re st on lo n g -te r m d e b t.
O t h e r In t e r e s t
NET IN C O M E
N e t In c o m e pe r share of c o m m o n stock (b a s e d
u p o n a v e r a g e n u m b e r o f s h ares o u t s t a n d i n g )
a f te r d iv id e n d s o f $ 1 ,2 0 9 ,5 3 4 o n p r e f e r r e d stocks

\J ( 1 4 4 , 7 7 0

i

1973

3 7 ,4 2 5 ,7 2 9
7 3 5 .5 9 9
1 0 8 .0 4 8 .3 6 6

1 ,2 7 4 ,7 4 9
1 ,1 9 3 .3 0 2
2.4 68 051
3 2 .6 1 2 .7 5 0

2 , 14 2 , 4 ( » 2

9 ,0 9 3 ,9 7 9
6 9 9 .2 3 5
9 ,7 9 3 ,2 1 4

2 (.'Î7 ( ,8 7 9

$ 22,819,536

$2 9 8

$2 88
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EXHIBIT 9
C O < N S O L I P A T I D B A L A N C E S H E E T THE M O N T A N A PO W E R

c o m p a n y a n d s u b s id ia r ie s

(Based on accounts prescribed by the Federal Power Commission — Note 1)
ASSETS
PROPERTY A N D PLANT IN SERVICE A N D
U N D E R CONSTRUCTION:
Utility properties;
Electric
,.
Natural gas
Water and c o m m o n utility
Construction work in progress
Norvutility property (includes $18,793,934 and
$4,241,791 construction work in progress)

December 31
1974

1973

$ 2 9 0 ,6 3 4 ,79S
1 3 4 ,3 4 6 ,9 2 2
1 7 ,8 9 7 ,1 0 8
7 6,6 9 0 ,0 8 6

$273,144,779
128,299,516
17,122,637
32,942,209

5 4 ,426,747

30,197.421
481,706,562
122.972.961
358,733,601
2,476,114

57 3 , 9 9 5 , 6 5 8

Less— Accumulated depreciation and depletion

1 3 0 .4 1 6 ,1 4 8
4 4 3 ,5 7 9 ,5 1 0

M I S CELLANEOUS INVESTMENTS (at cost)
C U R R E N T ASSETS:
Cash (Note 4)
..
Accounts receivable, less allowance for doubtful accounts
Materials and supplies (principally at average cost).
Prepayments and other assets.

2 .7 1 3 ,2 1 1
1 5,365,000
1 7 , 5 7 0 , 6 30
7 ,146,65.3
4 .1 9 1 ,3 7 4
4 4 ,2 7 3 ,6 5 7

DEFERREDCHARGES
Preliminary survey and investigation charges.

3 ,5 5 7 ,1 6 2

U n a m o r t i z e d d e b t empense . . .

8 7 9 ,0 6 6
3 9 8 ,7 4 4
1 9 0 ,4 0 9
6 ,7 6 3 ,4 4 7
( 3,915,737)
7 . 8 7 3 , 111

Extraordinary property loss (Note 1)
Headwater .benefit charges (Note 1)
Kerr Project charges (Note 1)
Deferred taxes attributable to Kerr Project charges

$ 4 9 8 ,4 3 9 ,4 8 9

LIABILITIES
CAPITALIZATION:
Shareholders' investment:
Capital stock (Note 2);
Preferred
Common
Discount and expense on capital stock (Note 2). .
Earnings retained for use in the business (Notes 1 and 3)
Treasury stock — c o m m o n (at cost) (Note 2).
Long-term debt (Note 3) .
C U R R E N T LIABILITIES:
Notes payable to banks (Note 4).
Long-term debt — portion due within one year
Dividends payable ..
U S and Canadian income taxes.
Other taxes
Accounts payable and other liabilities .
DEFERBEDCREDITS:
Customer advances for construction
Investment tax credit (Note 1)
RESERVES FOR INJURIES, D A M A G E S ,
EMPLOYEES P R OVIDENT A N D O T H E R
CON T R I B U T I O N S BY C U S T O M E R S FOR
C O N S T R U C T I O N OF PROPERTY (Note 1)
A C C U M U L A T E D I N C O M E TAX RED U C T I O N S
RESULTING F R O M ACCELERATED
DEPRECIATION A N D A M O R T I Z A T I O N (Note 1)

$

21,9 8 3 ,5 0 0
1 4 1 ,4 9 3 ,0 4 5
(2 ,3 8 2 ,0 0 6 )
.35,2 07,760
1 9 6 ,3 0 2 .2 9 9
(2 7 1 ,4 1 2 )
1 9 6 ,0 3 0 ,8 8 7
2 1 6 .8 7 6 ,6 1 9
4 1 2 ,9 0 7 ,5 0 6
.34,0 00,000

8,450,372
12,704,272
3,980,396
2.869.699
28,004,739
987,619
370,080
471,243
380,818
7,655.330
(4.432.096)
5.432.992
$394,647,446

$ 21,983,500
113,399,595
(979,334)
26.550.531
160,954,292
- (271.412)
160,682,880
152.939,191
313,622,071
30,500,000

110.000
4 ,238,694
2 ,300,789
5 ,4 8 2 ,8 0 0
1 6 ,3 2 0 ,8 7 4
62,45.3,157
2 ,2 2 1 ,5 2 8
4 .577.787
6 ,7 9 9 ,3 1 5
9 9 4 ,3 6 9

3,686,994
3,435,264
5,305,659
10.252,681
53,180,598
2,114,613

__

^20^060
938,717
7,076,760

15,285.142
$ 4 9 8 ,4 3 9 ,4 8 9

13.624.240
$394,647,446
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Most often the investment tax credit deferral is part of the other deferred
taxes or even lumped together ivith all deferred credits.

The deferred in

vestment tax credit balances in many large companies continue to increase
each year as companies invest more funds at higher inflated value.

Exhibit

10, below, shows some typical balances in the deferred investment credit
accounts for utility companies.
EXHIBIT 10
Some Typical Balances in the Accumulated Deferred Investment
Credit Per Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1974
Amount of Accumulated
Deferred Investment Credit

Company
Montana Power Company
Montana—Dakota Utilities

$ 4,577,787
4 ,0 6 8 ,0 0 0

Pacific Power and Light

6 ,7 2 7 ,9 6 1

Consolidated Edison of M.Y.

9 ,6 4 3 ,7 3 5
6 4 ,6 3 3 ,0 0 0

Illinois Bell Telephone
Pennsylvania Electric Co.

9,4^9,2,47

Source;

Moody’s Investor

Moody*s Public Utility Manual 1975 (New York:
Service, Inc•, 1975)•

In some cases, the investment tax credit shows up in the accumulated
depreciation account.

Georgia-Pacific Corporation stated in its "Notes*':

The corporation realized investment tax credits of $8.4 million
in 1973 and $5.8 million in 1972. The credits realized since
1962, less amortization credited to depreciation expense to date
($6.0 million in 1973 and $5*5 million in 1972), totaled $24.5
million at December 31, 1973, and are included in the reserves
for depreciation.^
7 Ibid., p. 840.
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The Carnation Company* s Annual Report for December 31t 19731 showed
"unamortized investment credit included v/ith accumulated depreciation in
balance sheet.
Presentation of investment taj'i credit on the Statement of Changes
in Financial Position will depend on the method used and the presentation
made on the balance sheet.

In all cases, the investment tax credit would

be considered as a source of funds.

If "flovj throu^fÿi" is used, the in

vestment tax credit will be reflected in the "Met Income from Current
Operations."

If the "deferral" method is used, the investment ta>: credit

would be considered as one of the items not requiring current outlays,
either as a depreciation and amortization item or as a deferred credit.
Since the investment tax credit (especially under the new liigher rates)
is a material source of funds to purchase property, it seems logical to
segregate its amount on the Statement of Changes in Financial Position.
Such vd.de variety in presentation of investment tax credit informa
tion on financial statements makes looking for this data a real challenge
to financial analysts.

VJhile readers of financial statements should read

the "Dotes" carefully to assess the real impact of the data, this is
often not the case.

With the effects of the investment tax credit throi^m

in as a composite of other items, a hurried and superficial reading of
the statements could prove very misleading.
Disclosure Rules
The 1971 Revenue Act reinforced by Treasury Releases specify that
disclosure as to the method and anount of the investment tax credit must
^Ibid.
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be made.

The APB Ac count in ,ri; Principles, Section U. A094» states that the

method must always be disclosed regardless of the amount, but the amount
may be omitted only if clearly insignificant.

If two methods are used,

one for "old" credits and another for "new," both methods and ajnounts must
be disclosed.
Practice in disclosure varies widely, most firms complying with
the rules by listing method and amount in the "Notes to Financial State
ments."

Referring back to Exhibit 3? however, 26 firms out of the 600

surveyed made no mention whatsoever to the investment taec credit.

Gome

firms reveal even more information than recjuired lilce Copperweld Corpora
tion who revealed:

"The investment ta:^ credit on new facilities installed

during 1973 amounted to $637,000, equal to $.26 per share."'
Some firms may feel exempt from the disclosure rule in that they
are "not subject to the jurisdiction, or making reports to, federal
agencies."
reports.)

(For the purpose of this ruling, tax returns are not financial
Yet the A].^3 states that all financial statements prepared "in

accordance with generally accepted accounting procedures"— a phrase vital
to the auditor's unqualified opinion— must disclose.

If disclosure is

not made, an exception is called for in the auditor's opinion.
Another exception, for the purpose of the auditor's opinion, must
be made when companies cliange the method of accounting for investment
tax credit because this constitutes a significant "accounting change"
which is not in "accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."
Such a case might arise with a parent company and its subsidiaries, since
'Ibid., p. 347.

3k
the APE Ac count in.f; Principle g require that the same method of accounting
for the investment credit should be adopted by a parent and its subsid
iaries in consolidated financial statements and other financial reports.
Technical Difficulties
An accountant’s worksheet for the calculation of the investment
ta:': credit would intimidate most financial analysts.

Even many accountants

feel frustration in trying to compute the investment tæ: credit,

E::hibit

11, page 3 5 j displays an analysis and allocation of investment ta:: credit
by Montana—Dal:ota Utilities Comapny in its 1975 rate hearing before the
Montana Public Service Commission,

A glance at the computations demon

strates thé complexity of calculations using the deferral method, working
with rates which vary from 3j A, and 7 percent (now 10 or 11 percent) as
applied in various years under different regulations.

And even this work

sheet does not show the "carrybacks" and "carryforwards" which must be
calculated for income tax purposes.

The varying rates and limit restric

tions over the years demand a "heads up" accountant to calculate.

Every

time a change or suspension is enacted, dates and deadlines become critical
as to when property was first ordered or put into use or construction
started.
Uhen firms have large carryovers (for tax purposes) they are not
certain as to the effects until those future years’ taxable income has
been determined.

As an example, Evans Products’ Annual Report of 1974

stated in its "Motes to Financial Statements":

"Investment tax carry—

forv/ards consist of $l5,5o3,030 which expire Eecember 31» 1977 and
December 31» 19^1."

(These tax carryforwards should not be confused with
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Montana-Bakota Utilities Company, lichibit II-2, page 5» in the Rate Case Hearing before the
Montana Public Service Commission, 1975, Pocket Mo. 6277.
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unamortized deferred investment ta% credit balances on the financial state
ments.

The tax carryfonwards relate to income tax credits available for

future years.

If, for example, Evans is in a loss position in those

future years, it will lose those credits.)

There is not any stipulation

under current practices that requires a firm to disclose carryforrvard in
come tax credits.
Special Problems with Public Utility Company Refoulâtions
In the case of public utility companies whose rates set by
regulatory commissions are usually determined on rate of return on a
specified rate base, special problems arose with the "flow througli"
method of accounting for investment tax credit.

By requiring utilities

under their jurisdiction to flow through the investment tax credit (re
sulting in a higher net income for the test years) regulatory commissions
could enforce lower consumer rates passing through all the benefits of
the investment credit to the consumer.

The investment tax credit, instead

of becoming a source of funds which could be invested by the company into
productive facilities, would become nothing more— under the "flow through"—
than a consumer rebate.
To counteract this effect which ran counter to the intentions of
Congress, public utilities came under special tax restrictions as to how
the investment tau: credit should be accounted for.

The tax codes, while

not directly dictating to the regulatory commissions as to how to set
rates, put teeth into their restrictions by saying that if the commissions
and the utility companies did not comply with the tax re,gulations, the
utility company could lose all its investment tax credit benefits altogether,
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Congress had considered the related aspect of the "flow through"
problem in 19&9 with respect to accelerated depreciation.

At that time,

the intention of Congress was to share the benefits of tax incentives be
tween the investors and the customers.

The regulations involving the in

vestment credit were essentially similar to the 19&9 depreciation legisla
tion.
Utility companies use two methods of flowing through the invest
ment tcLx credit:

(l) by reducing the depreciable basis of the property

involved by the amount of the credit which results in a reduction of the
rate base, and (2) reducing the amount of Federal income tax taken into
account- in the year of acquisition which results in an increased net income,
and higgler rate of return on investment.
With regard to the treatment of the credit for rate-making
purposes, the law provided three basic elective options:
1.

If the investment tax credit is flowed through as a reduction

of the rate base, the utility vri.ll lose its credit unless the reduction
of the rate base is then restored, ratably, to the rate base over the
useful life of the property.
2.

If the investment tax credit is flowed through to income in

the year of acquisition as a reduction of income tax expense, the utility
company will lose its investment tax credit benefits if the credit is
flowed through to income faster than ratably over the use of the property.
All regulated companies are to be allowed to choose between
Option (l) and Option (2) by malcing an election.
Option (l) applies.

If no election is made,

3Ô
Option (3 ) is available only as an alternative to either

3.
Option

(1) or

(2).

This option is available only for utility companies

who use the "flow through" method for accelerated depreciation rules of
the 1969 Tax Reform Act.

It provides a special election made at the tax

payer's own option (without regard to any requirement by a regulatory body)
to allow an immediate flow through of the investment tax credit without
the disallowance vrith respect to property where the benefits of accelerated
depreciation are also flowed through to customers.
In all cases, the agency may not require the company to treat the
investment credit on its reports to shareholders or to the public in any
way different from the way the company treats investment credit for ratemaking purposes.

This was to prevent utility companies from allocating

investment ta:: credit in such a way that it would result in higher earnings
per share for the purpose of financial reporting and lower rates of return
for the purpose of regulatory commissions.
Recent trends in the method of accounting for investment tax
credit by various regulated utility companies are summarized in I^xhibit
12, page 39.
As an example of the method of presentation on the Uchibits which
utility companies submit to regulatory bodies, Uchibit 13, page AO, is
Montana Power Company's cost of service exhibit entered in its current
1975 rate hearing case before the Montana Public Servi.ce Commission.

Montana Power Company uses "normalization" or "deferral" methods in ac
counting for the investment tæc credit.

Ilotice that the entire invest

ment ta:-: credit of $3,359,779 available in the test year 1975 (line 20)
is a debit, and that the Federal Income Ta:: expense (line 26) is a
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EXHIBIT 12
A Survey of Current Practices of Utility Regulatory Commissions
in the Accounting and Rate—Making Treatment of the Tax
Reduction Attributable to the Investment Tax Credit
Accounting Method Used

Source:

Number of Commissions

Flow Through
Normalized
Either
Undecided
Other or not reported

9
31
6
3
7

Total

56

U.S., Congress, Federal Pov;er Commission, Federal and State
Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of dlectric. Gas, and
Tclenhonc Utilities (Washington, lîTcTl U.S. Covernmcnt Printing
Office, 1973), pp. ’117-120.

negative ^2,301,672.

The negative income taec expense really means that in

the test year 1975 there will be zero income ta:': and a carryback of 32,301,672
of unused credits to prior years providing sizable refunds.

Line 21,

"Amortization of Investment Tax Credit—Cr." reflects the "normalization"
or "amortisation" of former investment ta:: credits taken in prior years
over the life of the assets involved.
There has been much criticism of late, especially by consumer
advocate groups, of this "normalization" process, because consumers feel
that they are being unjustly burdened by investment ta:: credit debits
made in test years which in effect increase their cost of service.

Utility

companies argue that the "normalization" method equalizes the benefits of
the ta:< incentives among all the ratepayers— current and future— who will
benefit from the use of the facilities giving rise to the credits because
the normalization process spreads out those benefits more equitably over
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EXHIBIT 13
Cost of Service for Test Year,
Montana Power Company
rOWr.R COMPANY - MONTANA ELHCTnlC UTTI.ITY
TttrT»'(*%TANA
••vtT'H'., Cost of Service and Ral.incc for Hcturn
.1 - II
Ojieratioe. and Tc*t Year 1075 0;jcra t ions
A t 1 1 1774Under
Present and proposed Rates
(A)

APPLICANT’S EXIIiniT NO. 14
P.S.C. DOCKET NO. 6279
WITNESS:
J. J. Harrington

(B)

Actual 1974

(D)

(C)

Test Year 1975
Proposed
Present
Rates
Bates

$73,148,884

CROSS REVENUES

I

(RcviStfd 7/18/7SÏ

/6 9

3
4

COST OF SERVICE

5

purchased Power

L

Steam - Operation

7
a
9
I®
W
u

5,427,144
(Excl. - Fuel Cost)

Operation - Fuel Cost
Maintenance
Hydro - Operation
Maintenance
Transmisaion - Operation
Maintenance
Distribution - Operation

1,768,223

1,768,223

300,876

878 ,209

878,209

2,459,133

5,127.445

5,127,445

357,090

914,818

914,818

3,247,219

3,166,102

3,166,102

543,325

448,683

448,683

1,078,084

1,142,205

1,142,205

548,430

598,601

598,601

2,322,274

2,436,212

2 ,436, 212

Maintenance

1,768,897

1 ,800,711

1,800,711

IS

Customer Accounts Expenses

1,417,778

1,564,464

1,564,464

1*

Sales Expenses

540,896

518,565

518 565

IT

Administrative and General

M

Subtotal

5,427,833

5. 427 ,833

$25,792,071

525,792.071

4,830,265

7 ,779,372

7,779,372

Amort, of Investment Tax Credit - b r .

688,774

5,359,779

5,359,779

A m o r d of Investment Tax Credit - Cr.

106,226

125,019

125,019

3a

Prov. for Deferred Inc. Taxes - Lib. P epr. 1,181,490

2,392,535

2,392,535

03

Prov. for Deferred Inc. Taxes - Kerr

(516,361)

(516,361)

(516,361)

( 76,500)

( 76,500)

( 76,500)

*9
ao

predation

4 .573.116
$24,584,262

04

Taxes on Inc. Deferred in Prior Yrs.

as

Taxes Other Than Income Taxes

7,919,671

0 6

Income Taxes - Federal

8,268,030

37

Income Taxes - Corporation License Tax

1,565,107

3$

Subtotal

$23,754,250

OM

Total

$48,338,512

5»

BALANCE FOR RETURN
1 Pano4ea Red Figure

Source:

Montana Power Company.

$24,810,372

11 ,676,621
3ml,4 7%

11,914,321
4,96

*-,109,5 00
.25 53?. 74i

S/.330

fyo

L.ioamtA?
B3,/7r 770
S-JF, ft* 7 3 1

the life of the related assets.

Also, utility companies argue that the

intention of Congress is to share the tax benefits equally between investors
and ratepayers.

Nevertheless, there is no question that the current rate

payer will pay more for utility service under "normalization" than he
would under the "flow through" method.
Summary
In summary, then, despite specific regulations in the 1971 Revenue
Act in how to account for the investment tax credit with interpretations
by the AICPA and Treasury rulings, there still exists much latitude in
how a firm accounts for the investment tax credit and in how it is pre
sented on the financial statements, particularly as to detail disclosed
in the "Notes to Financial Statements,"

The dollar amounts involved are

quite significant in most cases, and as the 10 and 11 percent rates go
into effect vri.th new higher limits, the dollar amounts will be vastly more—
raising the specter of seriously distorting the comparability of financial
data.

CHAPTER V
MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS
Tax laws as instruunents of Federal fiscal policy can only be ap
praised by their results.

To assess the impact of the investment tax

credit, first the microeconomic effects on the individual firm will be
examined, then the macroeconomic considerations on the economy as a whole
will be discussed.
In looking at the individual firm, various research studies of
business firms conducted by economists will be presented as to how the
credit affected the firm's investment decisions, then the investment tax
credit will be analyzed as a factor in financial decision making, followed
by some practical considerations in making decisions which involve the in
vestment tax credit with particular emphasis on the ESOP rider.
Surveys of Individual Firms
In 1969 a survey was conducted to assess the effects of the fivemonth suspension of the investment tax credit from October 10, 1 96 6 , to
March 9, 1967#

A sample of 163 firms selected from Fortune's Directory

of the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States were
mailed a short three—question questionnaire.

The questions and their

results were:
1.

Did the suspension of the investment tax credit affect your
capital expenditure budget for the calendar year 19^7?
Results:

75-5/^ reported no effect.
2 4 .5^ reported some effect.
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Im

How much was your capital expenditure budget affected by the
suspension of the investment tax credit?
Results:

Of the 24*3^ which responded with "some effect" to
Question One above (total of 32 firms):
9
14
3
1
5

1,

reported a 5/^ reduction.
reported a lO'/o reduction,
reported a 20,,o reduction,
reported a 50/o reduction.
didn't know the amount,

Did this repeal of the investment tax credit require you to
seek additional external financing of capital expenditures?
Results:

94*3^ said, "No,"

Comments volunteered by respondents were revealing,
ficial reported:

"Our cycle of planning, commitments, and expenditures

is from one to three years.
pension."

A paper company of

Thus, we could not react in 196? to the sus

An auto parts firm official volunteered, "We believe that the

use of tax laws for such purposes is detrimental to the economy in general,
A financial consultant reported:
The investment tax credit is only one of several criteria con
sidered in investment decision making, and v;e have not attributed
any specific action to the suspension of the tax credit itself.
Decisions to invest in new plants and equipment are based
principally on whether the investment will contribute to the
profitable gro;vth of the company and whether the expenditure
will optimize the shareowner's investment.
In another questionnaire to individual firms conducted in 1966 by
p

Klein and Taubman ' in connection with their macroeconomic studies, the lag
time was shown to vary from four months to three years between investment
^William R. Parker, "The Impact of the Suspension of the 7"^ Invest
ment Credit," Management Accounting, February, 1969» p. 32.
2
Lawrence R, Klein and Paul Taubman, "Estimating Effects Within
a Complete Econometric Model," in Tax Incentives and Capital Spending,
ed, by Gary Fromm (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 197l)»
p. 197.
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decisions and their implementation.

The conclusion from this survey was

that the temporary suspension in 1966 had practically no effect on invest
ment,

Data on the companies surveyed suggested that investment incentives

of investment tax:' credit plus accelerated depreciation added about 1 full
percentage point to a typical firm’s rate of return in manufacturing.
Among the firms interviewed, most favored the investment tax credit over
accelerated depreciation and wanted the investment tax credit restored
and thought it should not have been suspended.

Because of the lag time,

the firms felt that the investment tax credit was not suitable as a shortrun instrument of economic policy and they did not like the uncertainty
of temporary changes.

Managers, for the most part, felt that short-run

policies could best be effected by changing the general corporation income
tax rate.
The most comprehensive and reliable survey on investment behavior
was conducted by the Department of Economics of the McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1968,

The questions involved

planned investment spending followed by actual expenditure data a year
later.

One of the interesting results of this survey series was that

most business managers had consistently underestimated the actual effects
of the investment tax credit,

Eisner and Lawler, two economists who have

also done macroeconomic studies on investment incentives, applied a
regression analysis to the McGraw-Hill studies in an attempt to assess
the effect of various tax incentives such as the investment tæ<. credit,
accelerated depreciation, and corporate income tax reduction.
suggested that:

The results

• • • survey respondents are unaware of all the influence,
direct and indirect, that particular policies may have on in
vestments, and that the tæc measures designed to stimulate or
discourage [suspension 1966'] capital expenditures indicated
only modest effects. Each dollar of loss or gain in taxes ap
peared to generate only very minor compensating capital expendi
ture.^
The Investment Tax Credit as a Factor
in Financial Decision Making
Since these surveys were conducted, however, the picture has
changed.

In 1975 not only was the rate of the investment tax credit in

creased, but it seems to have more permanence in our tax structure.

The

credit has been in effect for four straight years, just extended for two
more years, and under current proposed legislation will be extended to
I9SO to mention nothing of President Ford's proposal to make it permanent.
The 11 percent rate allowed in conjunction with a qualified ESOP
plan makes the investment tax credit an item to be reckoned with by
financial managers in considering alternatives for raising capital.
The manager of a firm can view the investment tax credit in several
ways:

(l) as a reduction of the Federal income tajc rate, (2) as a sub

sidy in the purchase of equipment which reduces the initial outlay of
capital required, that is its cost less the investment ta>: credit, (3 )
as increased percentage of return in a capital expenditure decision, (4)
as a critical factor in a "yes" or "no" decision on a capital investment
proposal, or (5) as additional cash flow which generates more internal
funds for investment (or to improve liquidity).
3Robert Eisner
.
.
and Patrick
J. Lawler, "Tax Policy and Investment:
An Analysis of Survey Responses," The American Economic Review, March,
1975, p. 211.

To illustrate these various viewpoints with resultant effects, a
very simple example is presented, chosen very carefully so as to eliminate
the complications of limitations, loss carrybacks and carryforwards, etc.
Assume a company has a net income of $50,000 before tax in 1975 and that
it paid income taxes in the amount of $3,000 in 1972, $5,000 in 1973, and
$10,000 in 1974#

In 1975, the company purchased a new machine for $200,000

with estimated life of ten years, and the machine qualifies for investment
credit.

The company plans to use double—declining balance depreciation

plus the 20 percent first-year bonus depreciation.
save $15,000 a year in labor costs each year.

The new equipment will

There is no scrap value.

The calculations in Exhibit 14, page 47, result in the following effects:
Effect Without
Investment Tax Credit
(1) Effective Tax Rate for 1975
(2) Cost of Equipment
(3) Return on Investment
(Discounted Cash Flow)
(4) Given Cost of Capital ^ lO/a
for a Capital Investment
Proposal
(5) Increase in Cash Flow

Effect With
Investment Tax Credit

21;'$

O/o

$200,000

$180,000

if
/
"Wo Go"

"Go"
$20,000

The point of this admittedly "contrived" example is to dramatize the po
tential effect of the investment tax credit on investment decisions.
Whether the financial manager views it as a tax rate reduction, a reduc
tion in cost, an increase in rate of return or as added cash flow, the
fact is that the dollar or percentage effect of the investment tax credit
cannot be ignored.

The higher rates of the new law and the higher costs

of equipment will incite managers to analyze the income tax status of the

EXHIBIT 14

A Hypothetical Example of a Net Present Value Study Showing Possible Effects
of the Investment Tax Credit on the Rate of Return
(in Thousands of Dollars)
1972

1975

1973

1974

_(5)

( 1.5)

50
10.5

1. Net Income Before Tax
2. Taxes Payable (oaid) Before ITC
3. ITC $200,000 0 10,= $20,000
Applied to Current Year
Carrybacks, Generating Refunds

(10.5)

,

(3)......

-0-

4. Total Taxes Due
5* Refunds from Prior Years

Total of 9.5
Net Present
Value

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

iP

ip

ip

I P

xp

9

10

Without Investment Credit
6,
7*
o.
9.

Original Investment
Savings in Labor
First Year Bonus Depreciation
Double Declining Balance Depr.

200
15
40
32.0

12. Cash Inflows After Ta::
13. Discount Factor © 7-3/4/j
14. Net Present Value

200.7

With Investment Credit
15. Line 1 above
16 . ITC and Refunds

20.5

16.4

13.1

10.4

10 .5 -

10.5

10.5

10.5

4 0 . 6

31.4
6.9

23.1
6.2

2 5 .4

25.5

2 5.5

5.6

25.5
5 .6

25 .5

3.9

35.5
7.3

5.6

5.6

5.6

67.9
.9231

31.7
.3613

27.7
.7994

24.5

19.3

19.9

19.9

.7419

21.9
# O'.J
'IjO

.6391

.5932

.5505

19.9
.5109

.47 42

63.0

27.3

22,1

13.2

15.1

12.7

11.3

10.9

10.2

9.4

67.9

31.7

27.7

23 .3

21.9

19.3

19.9

19.9

19.9

19.9

37.9
.9049

31.7
.3190

27.7
.7412

2 3 .3

21.9

.6707

.6070

19.3
.5493

19.9
.4971

19.9
.ZÆ99

.4071

79.5

25.9

20.5

15.9

13.3

10.9

9.9

3.9

3.1

19.9

2 0 . 0

17. Cash Infloi.’s
lo. Discount Factor T 10-^,;
19. Net Present Value

25.6

57.0
19.1

10. Cash Inflows
11. Tax Rate 0 22 ,

I P

200.2

"Changed to straight line depreciation,

u r 1 t— 1 ; b =

19.9

19.9
. 3 6 3 4

7.3
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firm very carefully and assess the specific impact of the credit in making
their investment decisions*
Some Important Things to Consider in Investment
Tax Credit Decisions
1,

While the decision of whether to use the "deferral" or "flow

through" has already been made in most cases, new companies should review
their "one-time free choice" carefully, because, as shovm before, the
choice can make a difference in the net income after tax figures and. earn
ings per share*
2*

In two-year building projects a choice must be made whether

to take the investment tax credit in the year of completion or on a per
centage of completion basis each year*

Generally the qualified progress

election is advisable, but the taxpayer with a substantial loss carryover
might find that accelerating the investment tax credit could cause the
carryover to lapse before it could be used*
3*

In equipment replacement decisions, recapture provisions of

the investment tax credit should always be weighed carefully because if
the old equipment has not lived out its life as estimated on the original
claim for the credit, the recapture may effectively reduce the amount of
the allowed investment tax credit on the new equipment*
4*

In planning plant construction projects, the taxpayer should

review the court decisions involving qualification of certain "structures."
For example, a sign attached to a building is eligible for investment tax
credit while a free-standing sign is considered a "structure" not elig
ible for the credit*

Structures allowed the investment tax credit in

court cases hinge upon their (l) movability, (2) v/hether or not the

49
structure is an integral part of the machinery, and (3 ) whether or not it
is a structural component of a building,
5*

In buy or lease decisions, the ultimate choice may rest on

whether or not the lessor retains the investment credit or passes it to
the lessee.

Under certain conditions, an individual or other noncorporate

lessor can claim the investment tax credit on new property or the lessor
may elect to pass on the credit to the lessee.

In negotiating the terms

of the lease, important items to consider are the useful life of the
property and who assumes the maintenance and insurance obligations in de
termining which party is eligible for the credit.
6,

In all capital expenditure decisions, the tax position of the

firm must be carefully assessed.

If the business firm is in a loss posi

tion and has been for several years, it may stand to lose part or all of
its investment tax credit.

Loss carryforwards and carrybackwards must be

taken into account along with the limitations of the credit allowed.
7,

On pollution control facilities, a choice must be made whether

to use the allowed rapid depreciation (60-month) or claim the investment
tax credit since the credit is not allowed on property which is being
amortized under special provisions,

Kenneth L, Powell, CPA for Touche

Ross and Co., solved this dilemma using a present value study proving that
in all cases, taking the new 10 percent investment tax credit rate along
with double—declining balance depreciation is superior to the 60-month
rapid amortization,
3,

(See Exhibit 15» page 50.)

In financial ratio analysis, particularly where one is com

paring a single firm from year to year, it may be more meaningful to use
"Earnings Before Tajv" since the effects of the investment tax credit can

EXHIBIT 15
Net Present Value Study Comparing
Rapid Amortization Versus Tax Credit
for Pollution Control Facilities
C O S T O F $1 M I L L I O N ASSET: R A P ID A M O R T I Z A T I O N
VS. IN V E S T M E N T C R E D IT

s%
R a p id A m ortization
I T C & D D B for
Asset L ife of:
7 years
8 years
] 0 years
12 years
14 years
15 years

Present Value A t
10 %
12%

§601,000

$621,000

500,000
520,000
511,000
560,000
577,000
585,000

531,000
5-13,000
566,000
587,000
606.000
614,000

11%

$640,000

$657.000

5 5 1,000
564,000
589,000
611,000
631,000
639,000
(A ll figures arc rounded to nearest §1,000)

569,000
581,000
610,000
633,000
652,000
1661,000

N o t e : I t ia n o t n e c e s s a r y to c o n sid e r a n a s s e t w it h a l i f e o f o v e r 1 5 y e a r s s in c e th e b a sis f o r ra p id
a m o r tiz a tio n o f a f a c ilit y is lim ite d to it s a d ju ste d b a sis o n n o t m o r e th a n a 1 5 -y e a r lif e . S e c tio n
1 6 9 (f).

Source:

Kenneth L. Powell, ’’Comparison of Rapid Amortization Versus
Tax Credit for Pollution Control Facilities,”- Journal of Taxation,
August, 1975» p. 84.

cause the tax expense to vary so much depending on the tæc status of the
firm and the rate allowed in different years.

A utility company, for ex

ample, had rates varying from 3 percent to U percent and nov/ to 10 and 11
percent— with the new rates applied 100 percent to costly new equipment.
The variations caused by the ta:{ changes can have substantial impact on
various ratios.

A financial analyst must also be on guard in comparing

different years of the same firm where the method of accounting for the
investment tax credit was changed as might have occurred under the 1971
Revenue Act.
9.

Employee Stock Option Plans,

/ui important decision the

financial manager must make is whether or not to take advantage of the

11 percent investment tax credit rate allowed for firms who use 1 percent
of the credit as contribution to an Ilnployee Stock Option Plan (ESOP).

If

the firm already has a plan, it may mean cancelling the old plan and
adopting a new one which will qualify under the new regulations.

Selling

a company's stock to its ovm employees is one method of raising needed
capital, especially when the Federal government is effectively providing
the funds.
Louis Kelso has developed an ESOP financing model which demonstrates
how an ESOP w o r k s . ( S e e Exhibit l6, page 52.)

In the model, the firm

uses borrowed funds, but vdLth the additional 1 percent investment tax
credit, some or all of the funds (depending on the tæc position of the
firm) will be provided through taj-c savings and possible taj: refunds from
carrybacks.

The way the model works is that the firm borrows $1 million

from the bank, then puts $1 million into the ESOP timist.
$1 million new stock from the company.
employee benefit plan contribution.

ESOP trust buys

The company now has $1 million in

The company now puts those funds to

work and the loan is repaid over its term by ESOP using annual contribu
tions made by the company to ESOP (the yearly installments of both prin
ciple and interest being fully deductible), and the employees end up with
$1 million in stock.
Kelso points out important factors in the ESOP option:

(l) be

certain the plan is qualified— that is, that it meets all the require
ments; (2) ESOP is. better in a capital-intensive company such as a utility
company, rather than in a labor-intensive company which generates a
Gordon Binns, Jr., "ESOPs: A Joint Piece of the Action,"
Financial Executive, September, 1975> p. A9*
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EKHIBIT 16
Kelso Financing Model for ESOP
ESOP financin g

e m p lo y e r

$1m

lo a n

$ 1m

lo a n

ESOP trust

$ lm

new

re p a y m e n t

bank

stock

e m p lo y e e s

U n d e r th is K e ls o fin a n c in g m o d e l, th e ESOP a c t u a lly acts as a f i n a n 
c ia l in te r m e d ia r y , firs t s e c u rin g th e $1 m illio n lo a n fr o m th e b a n k a n d
th e n p u r c h a s in g $1 m illio n in n e w stock fr o m th e c o m p a n y f o r e v e n 
tu a l d is tr ib u tio n to e m p lo y e e s . T h e e m p lo y e r th e n uses th is in je c tio n
o f n e w c o p ito l in th e b u s in e s s a n d r e p a y s it b y m o k in g to x d e d u c t
ib le c o n trib u tio n s o f $1 m illio n (ig n o r in g in te re s t) to th e ESOP o v e r
th e te r m o f th e lo o n so t h a t th e p ip n c o n , in tu r n , r e p a y th e b o n k .

Source;

Louis Kolso, economist and attorney, taken from article by
U, Gordon 73inns, Jr., "ESOPs: A Joint Piece of the Action,"
Financial S:ecutive, September, 1975, p. 50#
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relatively small number of shares per employee (even fractional); (3 ) the
company must generate enough income tax payable to take full advantage of
the extra 1 percentage point; (4 ) if new equity is issued, this might be
come a dilution for current stockholders; (5) under the ESOP the employees
must have voting rights, so there could be a question of control; (6) ad
ditional dividends must be paid; (?) in the case of early withdrawal, the
law is somewhat unclear as to the investment tax credit recapture; (S)
employee morale may suffer if the value of the stock suffers a deep de
cline; (9) unions might get into the act vith collective bargaining, etc.;
(10) in the case o f ■closely—held corporations, there is a real problem
with evaluating the shares; (ll) the set-up costs and bookkeeping costs
should be calculated since a record must be kept for each employee.
This warning list emphasizes that the ESOP rider is not for every
one.

However, on the plus side, a company which generates a large invest

ment tax credit can essentially fund an ESOP at little e:cpense to itself.
If the stock is not well—Icnoivn, ESOP makes a ready market.

The provision

could be used to good advantage in the case of a major stockholder or
owner of a small business or closely—held corporation who wants to divest
his holdings.
Summary of Microeconomic Effects
In summarizing the microeconomic effects of the investment tax
credit on the individual firm, it is fair to say that up until 1975 the
impact of the investment tax credit on investment decisions has not been
very great, but with new changes in the law more managers should and will
consider the investment tax credit implications in making major investment

5k
decisions.

This is not to say that the investment tax credit will be the

main factor in investment decisions; too many other considerations play
important roles such as the need to expand, other funds available, general
business conditions and future expectations.

Certainly, each situation

must be reviewed within the scope of its ovai facts.

The discussion here

is to point out the dramatic effects which can be attained by the invest
ment tax credit on investment decisions, and to relate important factors
of the tax law which may influence choices in investment ta>c credit matters,
Finally, the pros and cons of choosing the ESOP rider were explored with
various pitfalls pointed out along with its major advantage of raising
needed capital by using, in effect. Federal funds.

CHAPTER VI
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
Winston Churchill used to say that if you layed all the economists
in the world end to end in a straight line, they still would be pointing
in all different directions.

Economists* predictions and forecasts and

econometric studies using complex models in assessing the effects of the
investment tax credit are no exception to their reputation for never agree
ing on anything.

Two opposing theoretical vievrpoints exist:

(l) that the

investment tax credit is nothing more than a subsidy to a special interest
group (business) which just puts more tax burden on others, and (2) that
the investment tax credit is an essential capital recovery allowance that
will be put to use in producing more income that will eventually increase
tax revenues.
The Over—All Dollar Impact
Before exajnining the empirical studies and arguments supporting
these two viewpoints, the question of exactly how many dollars are in
volved by the enactment of the investment tax credit, must be answered.
many dollars docs it save the taxpayers; or viewed another way,

How

how much

does it cost the Federal government in lost revenues?
Data from income tax returns, unfortunately, is not broken down
to give these figures.

Rather, the onlydata available arc

made by government economists as part of their research for
exhibits and testimony before congressional hearings.
is a summary of these projections through the years.
55

the projections
use as

Exhibit 1?, page $6,
The estimates of

EXHIBIT 17

Estimated Decrease (increase) of Individual and Corporate liability
Effected by Enactment (Suspension, Repeal) of the Investment
Tax Credit as Estimated by Government Economists Through the Years
(in Billions of Dollars)
Year Projection
'.Jas ilade

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

I 96p

-1*7

-1.7'

-1.7

-.1 7

-1.7

Year Projection
Has Made

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1969^

+2.5

+3.0

+3#0

+3.0

-1.5

—

- 3.7

197H
1975^

1967

1968

1969

1975

1976

1977

—4.3

r-5.0

- 3.5
- 3.3

1975^

Year Projection
Was Made

1978

1969^

1980

+ 3.3

1975^

Sources:

1979

-3 .4

-3.6

- 3.7

^House Hearings, l9ol.
^House Hearings on Repeal of Investment Tæ-: Credit, 1969, Table 2, p. 12.
^House Hearings, Honorable John B. Connally^s Testimony, 1971, Table 11-3, p. 12.
4 Senate Hearings, Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 1975, Table 1, p. 19.

House Hearings, Tæc Reform Act of 1975, 1975, Table 1, p. 18.

vn
ON

tax savings effected by the investment tax credit varies, of course, de
pending on the year they were made and the particular provision of the tax
regulations under consideration at that time.
The over—all picture does tell us that the investment ta>: credit
saves taxpayers (or costs the government) around t.3 billion a year.

With

the new laws, higher rates and escalating costs of equipment, this figure is
now edging toward

billion a year.

The main question haunting economists is:

How many dollars of

capital investment arc actually spent as a result of the ta>: savings ef
fected by the in^ estmcnt tax credit?

In addressing their studies to this

question, economists must first sift out those investment dollars which
would have been spent anyivay without any tax credit, and then to find
some kind of correlation of the extra dollars spent as a result of the
investment tax credit.
Economic Studies
Studies which have been conducted thus far have focused on all
tax incentives, including accelerated depreciation.

Most of these studies

were carried out in the late 19é»0s having been published by the Brookings
Institute under the direction of Gary Fromm in 19^7.^

Gary Fromm is

probably the loading economist investigator into capital spending and is
currently conducting a study for the national Bureau of Economic Research
which has not been published.

D.C.:

^Gary Fromm (ed.). Tax Incentives and Capital Spending (Washington,
The Brookings•Institution, 1971)•
^

The first empirical economic study concerning the impact of the
investment tax credit was performed by Hall and Jorgenson in 19^7 using
complex econometric models with inputs in lag, various statistical data,
restrictive parameters and the like.

Their results indicated that "tax

policy can be highly effective in changing the level and timing of invest
ment expenditures.

The investment tax credit, essentially a subsidy to

the purchase of equipment, has had a greater impact than any one of the
o
other changes in tax policy during the post-war period.
ylnotlier study presented at the Brookings Institute "Conference
on the Effects of. Tax Policy on Investment," in 19^7 v;as one by Charles W.
Bischoff who reported:

"At least one ta>: measure, the investment tax

credit, is independently shovjn to have a statistically significant effect
3
on equipment expenditures."
In another study, Robert M. Coen worked under the premise that
tax investment incentives influence capital expenditures in two ways:
(l) reducing the implicit rental price of capital, and (2) by increasing
the flow of internal funds available for financing purchases of capital
goods.

Ibdiibit lo, page 59» shows the results he obtained using only a

switch from straight-line depreciation to double—declining balance, then
lumping both the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation to
gether.

His idea is that it is hard to assess each tax incentive
p

"Robert E. Hall and Dale VJ. Jorgenson, "Application of the Theory
of Optimal Capital Accumulation," in Tax Incentives and Capital Spending,
ed. by Gary Fromm (Washington, D.C.: ~ThcT Brookings Institution, 1971),
P# 59.
^Charles W. Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative Lag Dl.stribution,"
in Tax Incentives and Capital Spending, ed. by Gary Fromm (V/ashin.gton, D.C.
The Brookings Institut^ïon, 1971) , p. 124.

miBIT 18
The Effects of Various Tax Incentives 1954 to 1966
(in Billions of 1954 Dollars)

Date

Type of Incentive

1954-61

Switch from S/L to
DDB Depreciation

1966

Accelerated Depreciation
+
Investment Credit

i960

All Tax Incentives

1962-66

All Tax Incentives

Source:

Reduction in
Rental Price

Reduction of
Tax Rate
______ C3)_______

Additional
Cash Flow

Increase in
Expenditures

Tax Loss

;

;

5.1

0

5.1

19

20

2.8

8.6

3.1

Robert !!• Coen, "The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment," in Tax Incentives and Capital
Spending, ed, by Gary Fromm (Washington, D.C,: The Brookings Institution, 1971)#
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individually since they interact and reinforce each other to produce their
effect.

One of his conclusions was the fact that the tax incentives cost

the Federal government in tax savings $8.6 billion from 1962 through 1966
and resulted in actual additional investment of only $2.8 billion by all
firms during those same years.

It would have been cheaper, he points out,

to have either reduced the corporate tax rate directly, orfor thegovern
ment to spend the money directly by purchasing the needed productive
facilities for the firms.^
Since 1966, a staff of economists have been assigned to the
Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis, an economic detective bureau whose
duty it is to assess the impact of tax laws on the economy.

"No tax pro

posal becomes law without first having the spadework done by this office.
Ideas are analyzed to see if they will produce the fruits their sponsors
claim and if there are better, non-tax solutions."^

In 1966, Assistant

Secretary Surrey reported:
Tax credits are sought for college education, anti—pollution
machinery, manpower training, underground transmission lines,
state income taxes and a variety of other objectives. Their
sponsors never seem to test the link between the credit and
the objectives, but rely instead on the appeal of tax credits
and the social worth of the objectives. Yet that link nearly
always will not stand the application of a rigorous cost ef
fectiveness analysis, and it will generally be found that the
tax credit is wasteful and inefficient when compared with equal
or fewer dollars spent through a direct expenditure or other
non—tax programs.
Robert M. Coen, "The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment,"
in Tax Incentives and Capital Spending, ed. by Gary Fromm (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 197l)» pp. 131— 196.
5
"New Rash of Tax Laws on the Way," Nation's Business, September,
1966, p. 76.
^Ibld.. p. 77.

6i
Most of these studies were done on data prior to 19&9, but one
could surmise from the results of the rough models constructed in those
early studies that there is a positive correlation between the investment
tax credit and an increase in investment spending.
search will probably reach the same conclusion.

Later more recent re

But while the investment

tax credit does have definite impact on the amount of equipment investment
in this countryj the question of whether it is the best and most efficient
means of stimulating equipment expenditure remains quite doubtful.
Most of the econometric models use as basic data a figure called
"producer's durable equipment."

This figure is found monthly in the

Survey of Current Business issued by the Commerce Department's Economic
Analysis Bureau.

The "producers' durable equipment" is defined as fixed

investment less all residential investment less all structures, a defini
tion which closely resembles "Section 38" property which qualifies for in
vestment tax credit.
While not performing any elaborate econometric correlations, Ex
hibit 19, page 62, presents some recent raw data (l9&9 to 1975) in constant
195& dollars.

The figures point out the alarming decline of investment

in productive facilities as measured by "producers' durable equipment" in
recent years.

To dramatize this decline, the real Gross National Product

figures are presented concurrently suggesting some relationship between
the real "producers' durable equipment" dollars spent per real Gî^IP growth.
Two reasons have been advanced for the deterioration of dollars
invested in "producers' durable equipment":

(l) larger equipment invest

ments are required for pollution and safety requirements, investments
which do not result in GNP growth, and (2) the government sector has taken
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EXHIBIT 19
Investment in Producers* Durable Equipment
and Gross National Product
(in Billions of 195^ Dollars)

Investment in
Producers* Durable
Equipment
CTÎP
Source:

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

6A.3

64.9

66.6

60.1

69.3

63.1

57.1

725.6

722.1

746.3

792.5

339.2

821.2

303.3

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey
of Current Business, 1970-1975 (Uashin^-ton, B.C.: U.S. Government
Printin.f^ Office, 1975).

over some of these expenditures from the private sector.

Also, vjhile these

figures are presented in constant 1950 dollars, the inflation has undoubt
edly taken its toll in reduced investment expenditures plus the fact that
plants in recent years have been operating well under capacity.
Gary Fromm believes that inflation is causing much dislocation
since the depreciation allowances of firms fall behind the cost of re
placement capital or economic depreciation.

To finance capital expendi

tures, firms must borrow heavily and those who are already "up to the
hilt" must cut plains for capital spending.

"Inflation will continue to

take a substantial bite out of investment potential . . . .
is that many companies will cut capital spending plans.

The windup

Then we may find

that the resultant groivth of the capital stock would bo insufficient to
7
sustain the growth of output that society desires."
7

"Capital Crisis:
1975, p. 43

The Economy," Business dee]:, September 22,
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Two Current Opposing Viewpoints of the
Macroeconomic Effects
Contemporary pros and cons of the investment tax credit can be
summed up in the writings of two prominent men :

Robert Kisrier, professor

of Economics at Northwestern University who opposes the credit, and Joel
Barlow, a corporate lawyer who favors the credit.
RoberL Eisner's main objection to the investment tax credit is that
it is a subsidy to the business sector to invest in equipment which firms
would have invested in anyi'jay (without the subsidy) sheerly out of their
profit motive.

"The prime determinant of business investment is demand,"

argues Eisner.
Investment in plant and equipment falls off when the economy is
sluggish and excess capacity makes additional plant and equip
ment unnecessary • • • • Well-run firms will not be led to in
vest by tso: reductions which increase after-tax earnings but
do not make additional equipment profitable in the fact of
existing idle capacity. Where demand is brisk, firms will in
vest without special subsidy. Theoretical analysis, empirical
studies and the candid responses of businessmen supplemented by
my o\m v;orîç with McGraw-Hill survey data all tend to confirm
this view.^
Eisner's remarks are substantiated by current data of the recent
q
recession. The Conference Board reported that 425 large manufacturers
(between July 1, 1975» and August 25, 1975) were asked whether or not
plants could meet current demand.

Only 57 percent of the respondents in

dicated a need to expand present plant over the next twelve months, and
^Robert Eisner, "Tax Incentives for Investment," National Ta:-r
Journal, September, 1973» p. 399
9
^The
The Conference Board, Inc.,
I:
Capital Investment Conditions,
Second Half, 1975 (New York; The Conference Board, Inc., 1975)•

6/^
this was the lowest percentage in the ten-year history of the survey.

In

the third.quarter of 1975 (even though the new investment tax: credit was
in effect) , appropriations were doivn and cancellations were very high
(mostly due to petroleum and auto industries).

Corporate profits had in

creased considerably (32 percent in the third quanber over the second and
first quarters of 1975), but the appropriations for capital expenditures
had not responded to the increased profits.

"These large gains in cor

porate cash flow are being utilized primarily to improve liquidity of
corporate balance sheets rather than to increase capital appropriations."^^
In the light of recent data, it would seem Eisner is essentially
correct when he says that demand and plant capacity are the deciding fac
tors in whether to invest in plant and equipment, and not the availability
of funds provided either through internal operation or tax incentives.
Joel Barlow, a corporate lavfyer who claims a life-long career of
haggling with the 1RS over depreciation allowance, disagrees with this
view.

Tax incentives, says Barlow, rather than "gimmicks" or "loopholes"

should be considered as "capital recovery allowances" or costs of pro
ducing taxable income that, in turn, increases tax revenues.
Like President Kennedy when he first proposed the investment tax
credit, Joel Barlow is extremely concerned about the U.S. corporations'
ability to meet foreign competition under the existing ta:-: laws.

He pre

sents seven rather shocking statements (all well substantiated with statis
tics) regarding the relative strength of the United States in world economy,
V/hile these were made in September, 1973* most still hold true today.
^^The Conference Board, Inc., Capital Appropriations, Third Quarter,
1975 (New York: The Conference Board"] Inc. , 1975) •
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The United States has the lowest capital recovery tax allow
ances of any of the industrial nations.
2.

The United States has the highest percentage of overage
obsolete production facilities of any of the industrial
nations.

3«

The United States has the lowest ratio of investment in
production facilities in relation to Q T of any of the indus
trial nations.
The United States has the lowest rate of productivity in
crease of any of the industrial nations.

5.

The United States relies more heavily than any other indus
trial nation on income taxation with its penalty on pro
ductivity and efficiency.

).

Unlike the nations of the European Economic Community, the
U.S. places no reliance at all on the value added tax which
puts a penalty on high costs and inefficiency and no penalty
on saving and investment.

%

The United States is faced with increasingly serious problems
of trade deficits and unfavorable balances in international
payments.

Adjnittedly, no one would claim that all of these adverse economic
factors are attributable to our historically lower capital re
covery taj{ allowances, but the evidence is persuasive if not
conclusive that they have been a principal cause.
His seventh statement has been reversed in 1975» that is, the U.S.
has chalked up a trade surplus, mostly due to increased

agricultural

exports.
Barlow shoots dovjn any proposals for changing the credit either
by setting new limits or varying the rate up and down, saying the invest
ment tax credit, as first envisioned by Kennedy, was supposed to be a
permanent credit, and that 7 percent is the least the credit can be and
still sustain long-term growth and modernization needed for world competi
tion and sustain the position of the dollar.
11

Joel Barlow, "The Tax Law Bias Against Investment in Production
Facilities," National Tax Journal, September, 1973» p# 417.
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The dilemma between these tvjo opposing views as represented by
Barlow and Eisner can be explained by the change which has occurred in our
national climate and goals since Jolm

Kennedy took office in 196O.

During the Kennedy administration, a compelling drive for the U.S. to be
"Iluinber One*’ motivated much of our national policy including the *’Hoon
Mission."

Today, the national concerns arc not so much bo be the strongest

country in the world as they are to build a strong a stable domestic
economy which best fulfills the interest of the American.people— including
their concern for a clean and safe environnent.
The Current Capital Crisis
But according to many observers, not even the needs of the Amer
ican people will be met if we do not find ways to raise the needed capital
investment*
By the best estimates available, the U.S. will need the incred
ible sum of SA-5 trillion in new capital funds in the next 10
years; capital that, for the most part, will have to come from
the savings of the American people and the profits of American
business.
Given the ta:: laws and corporate balance sheets as they are,
and the economy as it is likely to be, there will not be enough
capital to meet those investment goals* Borne factors in this
equation must change or the U.S. economy of the late 1970*s and
1900 *s will be unlike anything the American people have seen in
nearly four decades! An economy marked by slower grovrth, higher^
unemployment, and fewer fulfilled promises for nearly everyone.
The problem of how best to stimulate this needed investment capital cannot
be taken li.ghtly, for the ultimate welfare of this country’s people seems
to be at sta]:o.
^^"Capital Crisis:

The Economy," p. 46*

Summary of Macroeconomic Effects
The rnacroocoiiomic effects of the investment tee: crciit, then, be
come important concerns for investiration.

Tlie amount, of the tarn: sa-'/in.as

involved is increasing' from around f3 billion a year to nearly 04 billion
a year,

D.ipirical studies have shoim a definite correlation between this

particular 'tæz incentive and investment spendiny; however, the amount of
the investment spending falls well t^elow the actual cost (;ncasurcd in re
duced taj: revenues) to the Federal povcrnmeiit.

’.niother the credit is an

unnecessary business ‘'subsidy” or wliethor it is a vital "capital recovery
allovjance” will jjrobably be debated for many years.

Regardless of the

view, there is a need to stii.iulate capital expenditures not only to keep
up vjibh forei.pl competition, but to continue to provide Americans with
their accustomed hiph standard of liviiig.

I'hile there is little doubt

that the investment tax credit does stimulate capital investment to some
degree, the greatest single factor of the amount of investment in produc
tive facilities is demand.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The investment tax credit began its sporadic life as an economic
experiment fostered by President John F. Kennedy.

He envisioned the credit

as a fiscal tool to stimulate investment in productive facilities neces
sary "for enriching the lives of our people and furthering the grovrth of
our economy . . .

[and] to compete with foreign goods in price and quality,

both at home and abroad."^

From its inception, the investment tax credit

has undergone hot debate in congressional committee rooms and economic
circles with more revisions, suspensions and repeals than any other tax
law.

Used as a fiscal spigot to smooth out the cycles of the economy, the

credit has been more than susceptible to political expediency, irinds of
economic gyrations and pressures of large-scale lobbying.
The income tax regulations emerging from the years of congres
sional tampering are so restrictive in nature, both as to amounts allowed
and the kinds of property which qualify, that the "letter of the law" is
a far cry from the "economic ideal."

As a result, the tax laws choke off

much of the effectiveness of the investment tax credit.
The boards and commissions responsible for interpretation of tax
laws have not been able to agree on the principles and practical applica
tion of accounting for the investment tax credit, resulting in tv/o
^U.S., President, "Message from the President of the United States,
Relative to our Federal Tax System," 87th Cong., 1st sess., House Doc. No.
140, John F. Kennedy, April 20, l96l.
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different methods of accounting knoivn as "flow through" and "deferral."
Conflict still rages today as to who should prescribe accounting prin
ciples— the Security Exchange Commission, the American Institute ofCertified
Public Accountants, or the Congress.

Out of this diversity emerges a wide range

of accounting trends and techniques for applying the investment tax credit
which makes comparability of current financial statements a difficult task.
In assessing the impact of the investment tax credit on individual
firms, surveys show that up to its repeal in 1969, the investment tax
credit did not much impress business managers, mostly because the uncer
tain nature of the credit did not lend itself to investment decisions
needing a lead time of several years between planning and implementation.
However, with the higher rates enacted in 1975 of 10 percent (ll percent
with an ESOP plan), business managers should and probably will carefully
weigh the effects of the investment tax credit in making their investment
decisions.
The tax savings effected by the investment tax credit is now
nearly $4 billion a year.

VThile economic studies show that the invest

ment tax credit has a significant positive correlation on the investment
expenditures made by firms, the amounts of those expenditures fall far
below the cost to the Federal government as measured in lost tax revenue.
There is little debate as to the need to increase capital investment, not
only to bolster the United States' competitive market position in world
trade, but to provide Americans with a high standard of living.

But

whether or not the investment tax credit is the most efficient and least
expensive investment incentive is a point of serious reservation.
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Proponents of the investment tax credit insist that it is essen
tially a "capital recovery allowance" which will, in the end, create more
production which will generate more tax revenue.

Yet there are those who

maintain strongly that the investment tax credit is a "business bonanza"
which "encourages investment most when the economy is booming and least
2
when there is substantial unemployment."
Furthermore, regardless of the
credit, business firms will tend to invest in productive facilities only
when it is profitable.

In this respect, consumer demand is probably the

most important single factor in investment decisions.
New studies are currently being conducted by Gary Fromm for the
National Bureau of Economic Research which, when published, may resolve
some of the debate over the economic effects of the investment tax credit.
But economists being what they are, the debate will probably never be
settled one way or the other.
In the meantime, right or wrong, the investment tax credit is
probably here to stay, at least through 1980 and maybe longer.

If it is

to become a permanent fixture in our tax structure, certain changes could
make it more effective.

The investment ta>: credit could operate more

directly and efficiently if the needless restrictions were lifted.

An

ideal tax incentive should be applied more equally to small businesses
as well as large corporations by providing a fully refundable credit so
that a company with no tax liability would get a direct payment and elim
inate the need for carrybacks and carryforwards.

Present "Section 38"

o
“Robert Eisner, "Bonanzas for Business Investment," Challenge,
November—December, 1973» P* 43#

property makes no economic sense with its petty distinctions based on
whether or not the property is a structure.

Rather, property should qual

ify for the credit based on the criteria of increased productive capacity
and efficiency.

Certainly the ESOP ’’piggyback rider" doesn't really be

long in the investment tax credit package.

If Congress wants to stimulate

a broader—based stock ownership, there are other more direct ways to do
it.

And most important, because of long reaction time the investment tax

credit should not be used as a fiscal spigot for cooling off or heating
up the economy.
It would behoove Congress' to think creatively of other alterna
tives to stimulate capital spending.

For if the predictions are true that

$4.5 trillion in capital investment will bo needed over the next ten years,
it will take more than those ta:': incentives currently in effect.

It has

been suggested that there are more direct ways other than through the tax
system which would stimulate business investment more efficiently.

Since

capital spending depends upon public sa^/ings, tliose fiscal policies which
encourage savings, such as lifting the ceiling on interest rates that
Savings and Loans can pay their depositors, should bo considered.
sury Secretary

Simon

Trea

has recently suggested allowing dividends paid

to investors to be deducted from taxable income by corporations which
would encourage more equity investment.

But even more beneficial would

be fiscal policies applied when resources are not fully employed which
would stimulate needed consumer demand, for demand is probably the most
important single factor in a firm's decision to expand productive facilities.
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If Congress would "free" the investment tax credit of needless re
strictions, it could better perform the job it was intended to do.

This,

coupled with innovative fiscal policies designed to more directly stimulate
investment, would.give American industry the boost it needs to provide
Americans with the "good life" free of pollution and full of material
welfare.
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